Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, the defendant's motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the defendant.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, we find that the continuous treatment doctrine did not toll her claim beyond the date of her letter which effectively discharged the defendant as her treating physician, to wit, November 11, 1985. The determination as to whether continuous treatment exists must focus on the patient (see, Rizk v. Cohen, 73 N.Y.2d 98; Edmonds v Getchonis, 150 A.D.2d 879), and the record at bar is devoid of any objective evidence to demonstrate that after November 11, 1985, the plaintiff retained the "continuous trust and confidence" which underlies the continuous treatment doctrine (see, Richardson v. Orentreich, 64 N.Y.2d 896; De Peralta v. Presbyterian Hosp., 121 A.D.2d 346). Accordingly, although the plaintiff's summons and complaint was served on the Nassau County Sheriff on May 13, 1988, the action is time-barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations, and must be dismissed (see, CPLR 214-a). Sullivan, J.P., Eiber, Rosenblatt and Ritter, JJ., concur.