Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We agree with the defendant that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that no unfavorable inference should be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify when no such charge was requested by the defendant. However, under the circumstances of this case, we find that error to be harmless (see, People v Vereen, 45 N.Y.2d 856).
The defendant's contention that the court improperly denied suppression of two showup identifications by the complainant is without merit. The first showup identification was spontaneously made by the complainant and was not the result of a police-arranged identification procedure (see, People v Whisby, 48 N.Y.2d 834; People v Harris, 171 A.D.2d 882; People v Webster, 169 A.D.2d 796; People v Boyd, 161 A.D.2d 719, 720; People v Rios, 156 A.D.2d 397). The second showup, made shortly thereafter, was merely confirmatory since the complainant had already spontaneously identified the defendant as the perpetrator (see, People v Johnson, 169 A.D.2d 779; People v Griffin, 161 A.D.2d 799; People v Brown, 161 A.D.2d 721; People v Jackson, 159 A.D.2d 640).
The trial court's Sandoval ruling, permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant concerning his prior convictions for assault, criminal trespass, and attempted grand larceny, as well as two pending criminal trespass indictments, was, in all respects, proper. These offenses were relevant to the defendant's credibility as a witness and his willingness to place his interests above those of society (see, People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377).
We find the defendant's remaining contention to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Brown, Eiber and O'Brien, JJ., concur.