JONES v. CHEVALIER

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Docket Number

No. 89-1294.

Attorney(S)

Kenneth D. Jones, Lafayette, for plaintiff/appellant. Ezeb Chevalier, Breaux Bridge, for defendant/appellee. Harris Racca, Michael A. Harris, Breaux Bridge, for defendant/appellee-Breaux Bridge.

Judges

FORET, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Kenneth David Jones filed a lawsuit against Ezeb Chevalier alleging liability based on a breach of an illegal contract. Jones claimed that Chevalier was responsible for his arrest and subsequent damages because Chevalier failed to warn him about a police investigation, contrary to their agreement. In response, Chevalier filed an exception of no cause of action, which the trial court granted. Jones appealed the judgment in favor of Chevalier.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in granting the exception of no cause of action without personally serving Jones with notice of the hearing.
Whether the alleged contract, being illegal and violating public order, could be enforced or give rise to a cause of action.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Jones contended that he was not given proper notice of the hearing on the exception of no cause of action.
He argued that he was deprived of an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing.

Appellee's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
La.C.C.P. art. 931	Evidence may not be introduced to support or controvert an exception of no cause of action.	Used to determine that Jones was not prejudiced by lack of notice since no evidence could be introduced at the exception hearing.
La.C.C.P. art. 927	The failure to disclose a cause of action is a peremptory objection that courts may notice on their own motion without a hearing.	Supported the conclusion that no hearing or notice was required for the exception of no cause of action to be granted.
La.C.C.P. art. 1314 and 1231, et seq.	Procedures governing personal service of notice.	Referenced to note that the record did not show Jones was personally served notice of the hearing.
La.C.C. art. 2030	Contracts violating public order are absolutely null and unenforceable; courts may declare such nullity on their own initiative.	Applied to hold that the alleged illegal contract was absolutely null, justifying dismissal without further hearing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that Jones was not personally served with notice of the hearing on the exception of no cause of action as required by procedural rules. However, it reasoned that Jones was not prejudiced by this omission because under La.C.C.P. art. 931, no evidence may be introduced to support or oppose such an exception, thus no hearing is necessary. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the failure to state a cause of action is a peremptory objection that may be noticed by the court sua sponte, without notice or hearing, pursuant to La.C.C.P. art. 927. The court also found that the alleged contract was illegal and violated public order, rendering it absolutely null and unenforceable under La.C.C. art. 2030. The court concluded that the trial court acted properly in granting the exception of no cause of action and affirming the dismissal of the suit.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the trial court granting the exception of no cause of action and dismissing the plaintiff's suit was affirmed.

The decision directly results in the dismissal of Jones' claim against Chevalier at appellant's costs. The court’s ruling confirms that courts may dismiss claims based on illegal contracts sua sponte without requiring notice or a hearing, and no new precedent was established beyond applying existing procedural and substantive law.

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KENNETH DAVID JONES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. EZEB CHEVALIER, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

FORET, Judge.

Plaintiff and appellant, Kenneth David Jones, appeals from a judgment in favor of Ezeb Chevalier, defendant and appellee herein.

Jones brought this action, alleging that Chevalier was liable to him for what appears to be a claim for breach of an illegal contract. Jones claims that Chevalier was responsible for his arrest and ensuing damages because Chevalier did not warn him of the police investigation into his activities, as agreed.

Chevalier filed an exception of no cause of action in response to Jones' petition, which was granted by the trial court.

By this appeal, Jones contends that he was not given notice of the hearing, and an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing on the exception of no cause of action. The record supports his contention. Although the record contains a notice of the hearing on the exception, the record does not reflect that Jones was personally served pursuant to La.C.C.P. art. 1314 and 1231, et seq.

Jones was not prejudiced by the lack of notice because evidence may not be introduced to support or controvert the exception of no cause of action. La.C.C.P. art. 931. Nor was Jones entitled to notice as a matter of constitutional due process: the failure to disclose a cause of action is a peremptory objection which may be noticed by either the trial or the appellate court on its own motion. La.C.C.P. art. 927. When either the trial or the appellate court notices the failure to disclose a cause of action, no hearing is required. Conversely, when notice is not given and no hearing is conducted, it must be presumed that the court, in granting the exception, has acted on its own motion.

Moreover, a contract which violates a rule of public order, as does this alleged agreement, is absolutely null, and unenforceable. La.C.C. art. 2030. The absolute nullity of such a contract may be declared by the court on its own initiative. Id.

The trial court's judgment was proper.

The judgment is affirmed at appellant's costs.

AFFIRMED.