Ordered that the appeal from the order dated December 20, 1988, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the order dated February 28, 1990, made upon reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated February 28, 1990, is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
We discern no impropriety in the Supreme Court's decision to strike the first and fourth affirmative defenses, which allege, respectively, set-off and double recovery, from the second third-party defendant's answer, as they are not viable defenses to this second third-party action for indemnification. We note that such defenses may, however, be raised by the second third-party defendant in the context of the main action (see, CPLR 1008; see also, Plath v Justus, 28 N.Y.2d 16, 23).
The affirmative defenses of lack of standing and nonentitlement to indemnification as a matter of law, the ninth and tenth such defenses, were also properly stricken as those affirmative defenses merely pleaded conclusions of law without supporting facts (see, Glenesk v Guidance Realty Corp., 36 A.D.2d 852, 853). In any event, those affirmative defenses are lacking in merit under the circumstances of this case.
Finally, the affirmative defenses of settlement and release, the second and third affirmative defenses, are not available in the context of an indemnification action, and, therefore, were also properly dismissed (see, General Obligations Law § 15-108; Riviello v Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 305-307). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Eiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.