Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the court's Sandoval ruling did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion, nor did it deprive the defendant of a fair trial. After considering the probative value of the defendant's eight prior arrests and five theft-related convictions, as well as the prejudicial effect of this evidence, the court ruled that should the defendant testify, he could be cross-examined concerning only two prior convictions, including the underlying facts.
It is well settled that the exclusion of cross-examination concerning prior convictions is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court (see, People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371 ; People v Mackey, 49 N.Y.2d 274). In this case, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion (see, People v Branch, 155 A.D.2d 475; People v Torres, 110 A.D.2d 794). Moreover, that the prior crimes, which were both theft-related, may be similar to the crime charged herein did not compel their exclusion (see, People v Torres, supra). The commission of crimes involving dishonesty are highly relevant to a defendant's credibility (see, People v Sandoval, supra). Further, that the defendant may specialize in one area of criminal activity will not automatically shield him from cross-examination as to those prior convictions (see, People v Rahman, 46 N.Y.2d 882; People v Monahan, 114 A.D.2d 380).
Finally, in light of the defendant's extensive criminal history, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Kunzeman, J.P., Kooper, Sullivan and Lawrence, JJ., concur.