Order and judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. It is well established that a hospital may bring a plenary action in its own right against the agency designated to declare Medicaid eligibility (see, Community-General Hosp. v Stone, 139 A.D.2d 948, lv dismissed 72 N.Y.2d 909; Long Beach Mem. Nursing Home v D'Elia, 108 A.D.2d 901, 902; Calvary Hosp. v D'Elia, 95 A.D.2d 817; Matter of North Shore Univ. Hosp. v D'Elia, 71 A.D.2d 991, 992, lv denied 48 N.Y.2d 604).
Supreme Court erred, however, in granting plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment. The cross motion was premature since issue had not been joined (see, CPLR 3212 [a]; City of Rochester v Chiarella, 65 N.Y.2d 92, 101; Fargo v Watertown Educ. Assn., 175 A.D.2d 633 [decided herewith]) and, in any event, the papers submitted in support of the cross motion were insufficient to establish plaintiff's entitlement to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562; Matter of Badenhausen v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 151 A.D.2d 913, 914; cf., Community-General Hosp. v Stone, supra). We are unable to conclude that the elderly patients to whom plaintiff provided hospital services were, as a matter of law, eligible for Medicaid benefits.