Adjudged that the proceeding is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioner claims that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial because his motion for a mistrial at the prior trial was provoked by deliberate prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree. Our review of the relevant portions of the record reveals that the prosecutor's conduct was not "intended to provoke the [petitioner] into moving for a mistrial" (Oregon v Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679). "Absent such a bad-faith intent, the misconduct does not constitute the type of prosecutorial overreaching contemplated by the United States Supreme Court as requiring the barring of reprosecution on the ground of double jeopardy" (People v Copeland, 127 A.D.2d 846, 847; see also, Schoendorf v Mullen, 152 A.D.2d 715, 716). Nor is retrial prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the New York State Constitution (see, N Y Const, art I, § 6; People v Presley, 136 A.D.2d 949). Kunzeman, J.P., Miller, O'Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.