Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, the evidence produced at the trial established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, was in the best position to determine credibility (People v Parks, 41 N.Y.2d 36, 47), and our independent weighing of the relative probative force of the conflicting trial testimony and the relative strength of the conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony convinces us that the trial court gave the evidence the weight it should be accorded (People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). The victim's account of the gunpoint assault by defendant, who had won over the affection of the victim's paramour, was credible. On the other hand, defendant's claim that the victim shot himself pursuant to a conspiracy between the victim and defendant's wife, offered through the testimony of the younger sister of defendant's wife, was thoroughly impeached. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit an error by crediting the victim's account of the material facts (see, People v Suarez, 162 A.D.2d 302, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 944), which was sufficient to disprove defendant's alibi beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's post-conviction motion to set aside the verdict, since the proffered testimony did not suggest that the outcome of the trial would have been different had it been considered by the trial court (People v Slaughter, 37 N.Y.2d 596, 601). The new witness, the victim's estranged father, was obviously biased against his son, and his "new" evidence was no more than impeachment evidence.
Concur — Milonas, J.P., Rosenberger, Ellerin, Ross and Rubin, JJ.