Judgment unanimously reversed on the law and new trial granted. Memorandum: In its charge to the jury, the trial court incorrectly defined reasonable doubt as a doubt "based entirely and absolutely on good sound substantial reason" and, on three occasions, stated that a juror who harbors doubt should be able to articulate a good reason for such doubt to his fellow jurors. Defendant objected to the charge as given, thereby preserving this issue for review. Because the charge as a whole failed to convey the proper standard to the jury, reversal is required (see, People v Phoenix, 148 A.D.2d 942, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 1020; People v Jimenez, 147 A.D.2d 905, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 978; People v Luis, 145 A.D.2d 960, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 923; People v Price, 144 A.D.2d 1013, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 895; People v Mitchell, 124 A.D.2d 977; People v La Rosa, 112 A.D.2d 954; People v Balian, 49 A.D.2d 94). We have examined the remaining issue raised by defendant and find it to be lacking in merit.