TRAILMOBILE DIV. OF PULLMAN, INC. v. HIGGS

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Docket Number

No. 72-170 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Attorney(S)

Charles W. King, of King and Naegler, of Edwardsville, for appellant. James J. Gomric, of Belleville, for appellees.

Judges

Mr. JUSTICE JONES delivered the opinion of the court:

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff-appellant Trailmobile Division of Pullman, Inc. sued to recover a balance of $2,110.45 owed on a trailer sale. Defendants-counterplaintiffs (including Leonard Higgs) counterclaimed based on strict liability (citing Suvada v. White Motor Co.). The trial court found for the counterplaintiff and entered judgment offsetting Trailmobile's $2,110.45 claim against a $5,141.50 award on the counterclaim, resulting in a net judgment for the counterplaintiff of $3,031.05. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment on the counterclaim, arguing insufficiency of proof that the defect existed when the trailer left the manufacturer's hands and that the trial court used an improper measure of damages. The appeal was heard by the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District (Judge Alvin H. Maeys, Jr., presiding below).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the evidence was sufficient to show the allegedly defective condition existed when the trailer left the manufacturer's hands.
Whether the trial court applied the proper measure of damages in assessing the counterclaim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The proof on the counterclaim was insufficient because there was no evidence that the allegedly defective condition existed at the time the trailer left the manufacturer.
The trial court applied an improper rule in measuring damages.

Appellees' (Counterplaintiff's) Arguments

Counterplaintiff testified he ordered and inspected the trailer, operated it for a year without difficulty, and that while in use the spare tire rack came loose because the welds broke.
Counterplaintiff asserted Trailmobile was obliged to repair the rack and resulting damage; he took the trailer to a Trailmobile office, stopped payments, and awaited Trailmobile's action until repossession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182	Framework of strict liability (counterclaim asserted in that fashion).	Cited as the form of strict-liability theory relied on by the parties; court accepted that the counterclaim was presented on that basis and did not revisit the scope of strict liability.
Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co., 130 Ill. App.2d 844, 265 N.E.2d 212	Circumstantial-evidence standard for product failure to perform as expected.	Used to support the conclusion that, on the narrow record presented, circumstantial evidence could permit a finding that the product failed to perform as reasonably expected.
Dunham v. Vaughan Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401	Principles related to product liability and proof of defect/performance.	Applied alongside Bollmeier to justify that the evidence sufficed to support liability on the counterclaim under the parties' presentation.
Janicek v. Szmitke, 48 Ill. App.2d 214, 198 N.E.2d 694	Measure of damages for injury to personal property (repair vs. diminution in value).	Referenced to describe the correct measure of damages for repairable injury and for property worth less after repair.
Central Illinois Light Co. v. Stenzel, 44 Ill. App.2d 388, 195 N.E.2d 207	Measure of damages for injury to personal property.	Used to delineate the proper damage-measure rules contrasted with the trial court's approach.
Traut v. Horace L. Winslow Co. (abstract opinion), 201 Ill. App. 83	Authority concerning damages for injury to personal property.	Cited as additional authority on proper measures of damages for personal property injury.
I.L.P. Damages, sec. 144	Statement of legal principles governing damages for personal property injury.	Cited for the general rule on appropriate measures of damages (repair cost, diminution in value, or wreckage value depending on repairability).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the parties' framing of the counterclaim as one based on strict liability and declined to address the broader question of whether strict liability extends to property damage. On sufficiency of proof, the court held that, although the evidence was near the minimum, the trial judge as factfinder could rely on circumstantial evidence (the counterplaintiff's uncontradicted testimony about the trailer's purchase, inspection, year of trouble-free operation, the weld failure, and resulting damage) to find the product failed to perform as reasonably expected, citing Bollmeier and Dunham. On damages, the court found the trial court misconceived the proper rule: the trial court apparently awarded damages based on the cost of renting a substitute trailer for two years without evidence on repairability, repair cost, post-repair value, or mitigation. The appellate court explained the correct measures: ordinarily cost of repair plus value of use while deprived; if value after repair is less, the difference in market value plus repair cost; if not economically repairable, difference between pre-injury market value and wreckage value. Because the trial court used an improper measure and the record lacked necessary evidence, the court affirmed liability but reversed the damages award and remanded for proof and assessment of damages consistent with these principles.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Holding: The court affirmed the trial court's finding of liability on the counterclaim but reversed the damages determination and remanded for proper proof and assessment of damages under the correct legal measures.

Implications: The direct effect is that liability remains established for the counterclaim but the damages award must be reevaluated under the measures outlined by the court (repair cost/use value, diminution in value, or loss less wreckage value as applicable). The opinion does not announce a new rule of law beyond applying established authorities cited in the decision.

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TRAILMOBILE DIVISION OF PULLMAN, INC., Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. LEONARD HIGGS et al., Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE JONES delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff-appellant sued to recover a balance of $2,110.45 owing on a trailer sale from defendants. The defendants counterclaimed, apparently basing their action on strict liability after the fashion of Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182. The court found in favor of the counterplaintiff, fixing damages in the amount of $3,031.05. The appeal is from the judgment on the counterclaim, the plaintiff contending that the proof on the counterclaim was insufficient and that the court applied the improper rules in measurement of damages.

No question is raised in this court but that strict liability extends to include claims for property damage. Accordingly, we will not raise this point ourselves but will pointedly note that we do not address the question. Both parties have advised us that liability on the counterclaim is based upon strict liability, although there was some mention at the trial of matters of warranty. We will consider this case only on the basis on which it is presented to us by the parties.

With respect to the adequacy of the evidence to prove counterplaintiff's claim, the only contention of the plaintiff is that there was no evidence that the allegedly defective condition of the product relied on existed at the time the trailer left the hands of the manufacturer, Trailmobile. It is the evidence of the counterplaintiff, without contradiction, that he ordered a trailer from the plaintiff, that the trailer was picked up by counterplaintiff's driver, that he agreed by execution of the chattel mortgage that he had inspected the unit, agreed it was in good working order, and agreed to provide and pay for all repairs and maintenance, that the truck was operated over the road for a year, carrying loads up to 40,000 pounds, that it was inspected regularly and afforded no difficulty during the year, that he examined the racks and weld, that he was not an engineer, had no concern about the weld, and it looked all right. While being operated upon the highway the tire rack, which had been welded on, came off, striking portions of the trailer, and causing damage. The sole direct evidence was the statement of the counterplaintiff, "The spare tire rack came loose because the welds broke." It was the personal theory of the counterplaintiff that plaintiff was obliged to repair the rack and all other damage which occurred in the incident. Accordingly, he took the trailer to a Trailmobile office and dropped it off, ceased making payments, and waited for their action until Trailmobile repossessed the trailer.

• 1 Although this case approaches very close to the bare minimum, the trial judge as trier of fact had circumstantial evidence from which he could find that there was evidence which tends to prove that the product failed to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in the light of its nature and intended function, as set forth in our decision in Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co., 130 Ill. App.2d 844, 265 N.E.2d 212, and under the terms of Dunham v. Vaughan Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401. We are able to arrive at this conclusion only upon the very narrow nature of the controversy as submitted by the parties.

• 2-5 It is apparent, however, that the trial court misconceived the proper rule on the measure of damage. In its judgment order the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Trailmobile on its complaint in the amount of $2,110.45, which was the balance due on the purchase contract. The court further rendered judgment in favor of defendants-counterplaintiff on his counterclaim against Trailmobile in the amount of $5,141.50. By offsetting plaintiff's judgment on its complaint the court rendered judgment in favor of defendants-counterplaintiff for $3,031.05. In assessing damages upon the counterclaim the court apparently used as the measure of damages the cost to the counterplaintiff of rental of a substitute trailer for a period of two years. Counterplaintiff produced no evidence regarding the repairability of the trailer, the cost of repair or evidence of the value of the trailer after repairs. Neither is it apparent whether any consideration was given to the question of mitigation of damages. The measure of damages for a repairable injury to personal property is ordinarily the cost of making the repair and the value of the use of the property while the owner is necessarily deprived of it by reason of the repair. If the property is worth less after it is repaired than its value before the injury, the measure of damages is the difference in the market value before the injury and in its repaired condition in addition to the reasonable cost of repairs. Where, however, the property cannot be economically repaired the measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the property before the injury and the value of the wreckage. Janicek v. Szmitke, 48 Ill. App.2d 214, 198 N.E.2d 694; Central Illinois Light Co. v. Stenzel, 44 Ill. App.2d 388, 195 N.E.2d 207; Traut v. Horace L. Winslow Co. (abstract opinion), 201 Ill. App. 83; I.L.P. Damages, sec. 144.

The judgment finding liability on the counterclaim is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for proof and assessment of damages in accordance with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

EBERSPACHER, P.J., and CREBS, J., concur.