Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (cf., People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This proceeding was commenced against the appellant based on the allegation of the arresting officer that he possessed a loaded handgun. The appellant contends that his testimony at the fact-finding hearing was sufficient to make out a defense of temporary, innocent possession of the handgun which the presentment agency was required to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Almodovar, 62 N.Y.2d 126; People v. Williams, 50 N.Y.2d 1043; People v. Montgomery, 106 A.D.2d 410; cf., People v. Banks, 76 N.Y.2d 799). Since this case was tried before the court without a jury, great deference should be accorded the determination of the court in assessing credibility and resolving disputed questions of fact (see, Matter of Bernard J., 171 A.D.2d 794; Matter of Jamal V., 159 A.D.2d 507; Matter of Lavon S., 150 A.D.2d 460). The Family Court's decision indicates that it totally rejected the appellant's explanation for what he claimed was a momentary possession of the loaded handgun and credited the arresting officer's testimony that he observed the appellant remove the handgun from his waistband and throw it into the bushes. Giving due regard to the Family Court's determination of credibility, we find that the agency met its burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the court's determination was not against the weight of the evidence. Kunzeman, J.P., Sullivan, Eiber and O'Brien, JJ., concur.