Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the People were erroneously permitted to impeach their own witness, the victim's daughter and defendant's wife, with her Grand Jury testimony. That witness had testified before the Grand Jury that, before the attack, defendant stated that her mother "had to go" and that, on the evening of the attack upon her mother, she told the police that her mother was being killed by defendant. Before the witness was called to testify, the court was advised that she could no longer remember the incident. The prosecutor was permitted to call the witness, who testified that she no longer remembered the incident. The court then permitted the People to impeach the witness with her prior Grand Jury testimony. That was error.
"A party is not permitted to impeach its witness by his former statements where it has been amply warned of the adverse thrust of the witness'[s] testimony" (People v. Broadwater, 116 A.D.2d 1022, 1023; see also, People v. Fitzpatrick, 40 N.Y.2d 44, 52-53). Further, the witness's failure to remember did not disprove or affirmatively damage the People's case, and therefore the prosecutor was not entitled to impeach the witness through her prior sworn statements (see, CPL 60.35; People v. Saez, 69 N.Y.2d 802; People v. Mitchell, 143 A.D.2d 147, lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 1048; People v. Navarette, 131 A.D.2d 326, 328, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 705).
In impeaching the witness, the prosecutor also impermissibly disclosed to the trier of fact the contents of her prior inconsistent statements in violation of CPL 60.35 (3) (see, People v. Broadwater, supra; People v. Gilbert, 99 A.D.2d 657). Nevertheless, in view of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, we conclude that the error was harmless because there was no significant probability that, but for the error, the jury would have acquitted defendant (see, People v. Saez, supra; People v. Sampson, 145 A.D.2d 910, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 982; see also, People v. Gilbert, supra).