ROBERTSON v. ROBERTSON

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Docket Number

No. 77236.

Attorney(S)

William G. Crawford, Jr. of McDonald Crawford, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner. Alan R. Burton of Burton Burton, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from a dissolution of marriage proceeding concerning the disposition of the marital home. The home was purchased by the husband shortly after the parties married in 1985, using his premarital funds. Title was taken as tenants by the entireties. The husband testified he did not intend to gift any interest in the property to the wife, while the wife assumed joint ownership but acknowledged no explicit discussion occurred. The trial court found that the husband had made an intended and completed gift of the home and furnishings to the wife, declaring the property joint marital assets. The district court of appeal reversed the denial of the husband's claim for a special equity, holding the wife failed to prove the husband's donative intent. This Court accepted jurisdiction due to a conflict between the district court’s decision and another appellate decision, Straley v. Frank.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the burden of proof lies on the spouse claiming a special equity in property held as tenants by the entireties to prove that no gift was intended, or on the other spouse to prove donative intent.
Whether section 61.075(3)(a)5, Florida Statutes (1989), altered the common law presumption regarding the characterization of entireties property as marital or nonmarital.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Husband) Arguments

The husband contended he did not intend to make a gift of the marital home to the wife despite the property being titled jointly.
He asserted a special equity in the home because he purchased it with premarital funds.

Respondent (Wife) Arguments

The wife argued the home was a gift to her, supported by the joint purchase agreement and warranty deed.
The trial court accepted that the husband intended a gift, making the property marital.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ball v. Ball, 335 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1976)	Established that when one spouse pays for property held as tenants by the entireties from nonmarital funds, that spouse has a special equity unless a gift was intended.	The court recognized Ball as the prior rule but held that the 1989 statute altered the burden of proof established in Ball.
Straley v. Frank, 15 F.L.W. 2564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)	Interpreted section 61.075(3)(a)5 to place the burden on the donor spouse to prove no gift was intended, reversing the Ball presumption.	The court noted a conflict with this decision but ultimately disapproved it to the extent inconsistent with the current opinion.
Straley v. Frank, 585 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)	En banc decision repudiating the earlier panel decision and reaffirming the Ball principle despite the statute.	The Supreme Court acknowledged this decision but clarified that the statute preempts Ball.
Davis v. Davis, 282 So.2d 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)	Referenced as part of Florida’s prior law regarding property characterization before the statute.	Used to illustrate the legal state to which the statute purportedly returns the law.
Tiffany v. Tiffany, 305 So.2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)	Similar to Davis, related to property presumptions before the statute.	Referenced to explain the legal background affected by the statute.
Miceli v. Miceli, 533 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)	Described section 61.075 as a codification of existing case law with some modifications.	Supported the court's interpretation of the statute’s effect on equitable distribution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the conflict between the prior case law established in Ball v. Ball and the statutory provisions enacted in section 61.075(3)(a)5, Florida Statutes (1989). Under Ball, a spouse who supplied all consideration for property held as tenants by the entireties had a special equity unless the other spouse proved a gift was intended. However, the statute creates a presumption that all entireties property is marital, regardless of who paid for it, and places the burden on the spouse claiming a special equity to prove that no gift was intended. The Court found that this statutory presumption effectively preempted the common law rule in Ball. Because the dissolution was filed after the statute's effective date, the husband bore the burden to prove no gift was intended. The Court concluded the husband failed to meet this burden based on the record. The Court also noted the conflict with the earlier appellate decision in Straley v. Frank and disapproved that case to the extent it conflicted with the current interpretation.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the district court of appeal's decision and remanded the case for reinstatement of the trial court's judgment.

The direct effect is that the property is deemed marital, and the husband failed to prove a special equity under the statute. The Court's ruling clarifies that section 61.075(3)(a)5 places the burden on the spouse claiming a special equity to prove no gift was intended, thereby overruling the prior common law presumption from Ball v. Ball. No new precedent beyond this statutory interpretation was established, but the Court disapproved conflicting appellate authority.

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JOAN T. ROBERTSON, PETITIONER, v. DAVID L. ROBERTSON, RESPONDENT.

PER CURIAM.

We review Robertson v. Robertson, 569 So.2d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), because of its conflict with Straley v. Frank, 15 F.L.W. 2564 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 11, 1990). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.

The dispute in this dissolution proceeding concerns the disposition of the marital home. The home was bought with the husband's money within three months after the parties were married in 1985. Title to the home was taken as tenants by the entireties. The husband testified that he did not intend to make a gift to the wife of any interest in the property. The wife assumed that the home would be owned by both of them but admitted that there was no specific discussion between them on the subject. She testified that her husband told the real estate broker that title to the property should be in both names.

The final judgment of dissolution stated in pertinent part:

The Petitioner, DAVID L. ROBERTSON, claims a special equity in the marital residence and furnishings located at 5555 Bayview Drive, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The Petitioner shows that he purchased the marital home with his pre-marriage funds, however, the Court finds that the Petitioner created a gift to the Respondent of the described marital residence and the furnishings. The greater weight of the evidence supports the finding of an intended and completed gift of the marital residence and furnishings. The Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase of said marital residence, Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, shows that both parties signed and both parties' names appeared on the Purchase-Sale Agreement. Further, both the Petitioner, DAVID L. ROBERTSON, and the Respondent, JOAN T. ROBERTSON, his wife, appeared as the named grantees on the Warranty Deed, Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. In his Last Will and Testament, DAVID LEE ROBERTSON, SR., provided as follows:

"Jointly owned properties shall remain the property of my wife, JOAN T. ROBERTSON"

The marital residence appears to be the only jointly owned real estate that the parties ever owned, so it appears that the Petitioner's intent that this jointly owned and titled marital residence was to remain the property of JOAN T. ROBERTSON. Further, the evidence does not show any other intention but that of joint ownership of the marital residence until the Petitioner filed for a dissolution of the marriage and then asserted a special equity.

The Court finds that the described marital residence and furnishings is joint property of the parties.

The district court of appeal reversed that portion of the judgment which denied the husband a special equity in the marital home. Citing Ball v. Ball, 335 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1976), the court stated that because the home was purchased with the husband's money, the wife had the burden of proving that the husband intended to make a gift to the wife. The court held that the record failed to reflect that the wife proved the husband's donative intent at the time the home was jointly titled.

In Ball, this Court said:

[W]e hold that a special equity is created by an unrebutted showing, as was developed here, that all of the consideration for property held as tenants by the entireties was supplied by one spouse from a source clearly unconnected with the marital relationship. In these cases the property should be awarded to that spouse, as if the tenancy were created solely for survivorship purposes during coverture, in the absence of contradictory evidence that a gift was intended.

335 So.2d at 7 (footnote omitted).

An issue similar to that presented in the instant case arose in Straley v. Frank, 15 F.L.W. 2564 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 11, 1990). In that case, judges of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, sitting as the Second District Court of Appeal, stated:

Further, we note that section 61.075(3)(a)5 specifically provides:

All real property held by the parties as tenants by the entireties, whether acquired prior to or during the marriage, shall be presumed to be a marital asset. If, in any case, a party makes a claim to the contrary, the burden of proof shall be on the party asserting the claim for a special equity.

This section appears to undo the "no gift" presumption evolved by Ball v. Ball, 335 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1976); and returns the state of Florida's law on this point back to where it was in Davis v. Davis, 282 So.2d 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) and Tiffany v. Tiffany, 305 So.2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Under this statute, the donor spouse has the burden of proving no gift was intended. We easily conclude that Mark failed to carry the burden of proof on this issue.

15 F.L.W. at 2564-65 (footnote omitted).

The predicate for our jurisdiction in the instant case is its conflict with the foregoing statement in Straley. Subsequently, however, the judges of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc as the Second District Court of Appeal, repudiated the panel decision and held that the enactment of section 61.075(3)(a)5, Florida Statutes (1989), did not change the principle of Ball. Straley v. Frank, 585 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Notwithstanding the fact that there is no longer a conflict of decisions in the district courts of appeal, having accepted jurisdiction when there was a conflict, we have agreed to render a decision in this case because of the important issue involved.

Section 61.075, Florida Statutes (1989), created a statutory form of equitable distribution. The statute has been said to be a codification of existing case law. See Miceli v. Miceli, 533 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). While this is largely true, there appear to be some modifications. Under the statute, the parties' assets are to be divided into two categories: (1) marital assets and liabilities and (2) nonmarital assets and liabilities. The statute defines assets and liabilities falling within each of these categories and establishes certain presumptions to assist in categorizing each asset and liability. The court then divides the marital assets and liabilities between the spouses. Because equitable distribution is premised on the theory of an equal partnership in marriage, the court should begin this task on the premise that each spouse is entitled to receive an equal division. However, the court is directed to distribute the marital assets and liabilities "in such proportions as are equitable" after considering various enumerated factors as well as any other factors "necessary to do equity and justice between the parties." § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. (1989).

As we read it, section 61.075(3)(a)5 preempted the principle established in Ball. Under Ball, despite the fact that property was held as tenants by the entireties, when a spouse demonstrated that he or she had paid for the property from a source unconnected with the marriage, that spouse was entitled to a special equity in the property unless the other spouse could prove that a gift was intended. In contrast, the statute creates a presumption that entireties real estate is marital property regardless of who paid for it. The party claiming a special equity and seeking to have the property declared a nonmarital asset now has the burden of overcoming this presumption by proving that a gift was not intended. At least two commentators on the new statute have reached the same conclusion. Thus, 2 Florida Family Law (MB) § 34.24 (Mar. 1990) states:

§ 34.24 Effect of 1988 Statute

One important difference between case law and the statute is the treatment of real estate that is held by the parties as tenants by the entireties. The statute provides that the conveyance of premarital real estate to entireties ownership changes the character of the premarital property and creates a presumption that the parties intended the property to be subject to equitable distribution on divorce. In contrast, Ball v. Ball and subsequent cases held that once a spouse proved that property was originally nonmarital, a presumption arose that the property remained nonmarital, unless the other spouse could show that a gift was intended. Thus, the 1988 statute has shifted the burden of proof by creating a presumption that property transferred to a tenancy by the entireties is marital, regardless of its original acquisition. It is up to the spouse who claims a special equity interest to prove that a gift of that interest was not intended.

(Footnotes omitted.) See also 3 Fla.Fam. L. Rep. (MB) 219-20 (Sept. 1988).

In this case, the trial judge ruled for the wife without regard to the effect of the new statute. However, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the evidence supports the conclusion that a gift was intended because this suit was filed after October 1, 1988, the date upon which section 61.075 became effective. Therefore, the husband had the burden to prove no gift was intended. Clearly, there is ample support in this record for the conclusion that the husband did not meet his statutory burden of proving a special equity.

We quash the decision below and remand the case for reinstatement of the judgment of the trial court. We disapprove Straley v. Frank, 585 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.

GRIMES, J., recused.