Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by deleting the provision that certain of the sentences shall run consecutively and substituting therefor a provision that all of the sentences shall run concurrently to one another.
The court acted properly in discharging a sworn juror who expressly indicated that she could not be fair and impartial and that she would be unable to deliberate, regardless of the court's charge on the law (CPL 270.35; People v Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290, 299). Although the juror could not articulate the underlying reasons for her inability to deliberate fairly, her unequivocal statements that she could not be fair and impartial established that she was grossly unqualified (cf., People v Buford, supra; People v Anderson, 70 N.Y.2d 729, 730).
Moreover, the court's questioning of the sworn juror in the presence of the defense counsel, but in the absence of the defendant, did not deny him of his right to be present. The defendant waived any claim of error regarding his absence when he failed to object to the questioning procedure (see, People v Torres, 174 A.D.2d 586; People v Gamble, 173 A.D.2d 555; People v Hazzard, 177 A.D.2d 593; People v Grant, 178 A.D.2d 283; People v Bailey, 146 A.D.2d 788).
Finally, the sentence was excessive to the extent indicated. Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Santucci, JJ., concur.