Petitioner met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that respondent abandoned his child within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b (5) (a) (see, Matter of Leabert V., 174 A.D.2d 883, 884; Matter of I.R., 153 A.D.2d 559, 560). Specifically, testimony by the child's caseworker and the foster mother established that, although respondent was notified of the child's whereabouts by letters dated October 10, 1989 and November 9, 1989, he made no effort to contact either petitioner or the child's foster mother within six months preceding the filing of the petition herein (see, Matter of Crawford, 153 A.D.2d 108, 111). At the hearing, respondent failed to give a good reason for not communicating during the relevant time period (see, Matter of Charmaine T., 173 A.D.2d 625, 626-627; Matter of I.R., supra, at 560). In addition, the fact that respondent was incarcerated does not preclude a finding of abandonment as respondent did not show that he was prohibited from contacting either petitioner or the child during the relevant time period (see, Matter of Ravon Paul H., 161 A.D.2d 257; Matter of Stella B., 130 Misc.2d 148).
Mikoll, J.P., Yesawich Jr., Mercure, Mahoney and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.