Defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence and identification testimony was properly denied. The stop of defendant for a traffic violation supported the initial detention (People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413; People v. Robinson, 74 N.Y.2d 773). We note that the victim had described the perpetrators to officers other than those which had stopped the defendant's car for the vehicle traffic infraction. The unprompted identification of defendant by the victim as he drove by the stopped vehicle was not the product of suggestion or otherwise tainted (see generally, People v. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d 527). The evidence was properly seized subsequent to the arrest (People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49).
Defendant's argument that the complainant was simply the victim of a ruse and that no forcible taking occurred is without merit. One of the victim's companions was subjected to significant physical contact, and the complainant was subjected to aggressive and sharp commands. Thus, the totality of the circumstances (People v. Lazarcheck, 176 A.D.2d 691), viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490), are sufficient to support the jury's determination that defendant's conduct constituted the threatened use of force. (People v. Lazarcheck, supra.)
Defendant fails to show that the 10 years to life sentence is illegal or excessive, or based on a misunderstanding by the court regarding the lowest minimum term it could have imposed on its finding that defendant was a persistent violent felony offender. However, the court did err by not pronouncing specific sentences on the two remaining charges. Accordingly, the case is remanded for imposition of sentence (People v. Sturgis, 69 N.Y.2d 816; People v. Sandoval, 151 A.D.2d 620, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 852).
We have also considered defendant's remaining pro se claims, and find them unpreserved or to be without merit.
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Wallach, Kassal and Rubin, JJ.