Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. Memorandum: Supreme Court should have granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Defendants' alleged actions do not approach that level of extreme and outrageous behavior necessary to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (see, Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135; Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293; Angel v. Levittown Union Free School Dist. No. 5, 171 A.D.2d 770; Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 A.D.2d 169; Lincoln First Bank v. Barstro Assocs. Contr., 49 A.D.2d 1025). Thus, the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress should have been dismissed. The cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as plaintiffs conceded at oral argument, should have been dismissed as well; injury caused by negligent conduct is subject to the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Law (Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11, 29; see also, Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N.Y.2d 412). William Lawson's cause of action, being derivative only, must also be dismissed (see, Mehtani v. New York Life Ins. Co., 145 A.D.2d 90, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 835; see also, Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622).