Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and are not lightly set aside (see, e.g., Matter of Galasso, 35 N.Y.2d 319; Yuda v. Yuda, 143 A.D.2d 657). Absent a showing that the stipulation was the product of fraud, overreaching, mistake, or duress, it will not be disturbed (see, Bossom v. Bossom, 141 A.D.2d 794; Schieck v. Schieck, 138 A.D.2d 691).
The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to vacate the stipulation of settlement on the grounds that the agreement was unfair, unconscionable, and the product of fraud and duress. We disagree. Although the stipulation may have been improvidently entered into, we cannot conclude that it was unfair or unconscionable (see, Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 158 A.D.2d 585; Cantamessa v. Cantamessa, 170 A.D.2d 792; compare, Weinstock v. Weinstock, 167 A.D.2d 394; Yuda v. Yuda, supra). Moreover, the defendant's unsupported allegations of fraud and duress do not constitute a basis for vacating an agreement that is not manifestly unfair (see, Stoerchle v. Stoerchle, 101 A.D.2d 831; Chasin v. Chasin, 98 A.D.2d 788; Anderson v. Anderson, 90 A.D.2d 763).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Bracken, O'Brien and Santucci, JJ., concur.