Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's claim that he was denied his right to a speedy trial is unpreserved for appellate review due to his failure to make a motion on that ground to dismiss the indictment either before or at trial (see, CPL 30.30; People v. Jordan, 62 N.Y.2d 825). In any event, since delay resulting from adjournments to which the defendant has consented are not chargeable against the People (see, People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523), the People were ready within the statutory time limitation set forth in CPL 30.30 (1) (a).
Furthermore, the amended CPL 710.30 notice adequately apprised the defendant of the sum and substance of the statements to be offered at trial (see, People v. Brooks, 121 A.D.2d 392). Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the stipulation which produced the amended CPL 710.30 notice did not undermine his defense strategy and, therefore, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, the defendant's contentions concerning ineffective assistance of counsel require proof of less than meaningful representation, rather than simple disagreement with the strategies employed (see, People v. Benn, 68 N.Y.2d 941, 942).
The defendant's claims regarding purported reversible error occurring in the prosecutor's summation and the jury charge are unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Balls, 69 N.Y.2d 641), and in any event, are devoid of merit.
The sentence imposed by the court was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, O'Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.