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Docket Number

Docket No. 134266.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Larry J. Burdick, Prosecuting Attorney, and Diane M. Kuhn, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Daniel R. O'Neil, for the defendant. Amicus Curiae: Derril B. Jordan, for Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

Acts

Crimes And Criminal Procedure — Indians — Crimes — Indian Country Defined

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: PEOPLE v BENNETT, Docket No. 134266 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1992)

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant, a member of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, was arrested in Chippewa Township, Isabella County, and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (third offense), impaired driving (third offense), and driving with a suspended license (second offense). Defendant moved in circuit court to quash the information on the ground that the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the arrest occurred on land within the boundaries of the Isabella Indian reservation. The circuit court granted the motion to quash. The prosecution appealed the circuit court's August 31, 1990 order quashing the information. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the location where defendant was arrested constituted "Indian country" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, thus affecting state subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of an enrolled tribal member.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Arguments

Defendant was not in Indian country when arrested; the arrest location lies outside areas qualifying as Indian country.
Lands that were patented to non-Indians before the effective date of the 1864 Treaty were never part of the original Isabella reservation and therefore cannot be Indian country for jurisdictional purposes.
The prosecution presented documentation that the specific area where defendant was arrested was patented to non-Indians in July 1857 pursuant to cash purchases made in 1854.

Defendant's Arguments

Defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because he was arrested on land within the Isabella Indian reservation (i.e., within Indian country).
The circuit court accepted this position, finding that Leaton Road was a right-of-way running through the Isabella Indian Reservation and thus Indian country, with exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Choctaw Nation of Indians v United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432	Treaties with Indians must be construed, "so far as possible, in the sense in which the Indians understood them," and in a spirit that protects the interests of a dependent people.	The court invoked this principle to justify giving controlling weight to the plain language of the 1864 treaty and to interpret the treaty as excluding lands that had been previously sold (i.e., "unsold lands" reserved to the Chippewas did not include previously patented parcels).
Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 582; 8 L Ed 483 (1832)	"The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice" and ambiguous treaty language should be construed in the Indians' favor.	The court cited this longstanding canon of treaty construction to frame its approach but applied it in context with the treaty's plain language; because the 1864 treaty referred to "unsold lands," the court read that plain term as excluding previously patented land.
Oneida Co v Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247	Ambiguities in treaties are to be construed in favor of the Indians.	The court noted this principle but observed that, on the facts and plain treaty language before it, there was no contrary ambiguity to support the defendant's claim that previously patented lands had remained part of the reservation.
Oregon Dep't of Fish Wildlife v Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 774	Court should not ignore plain treaty language that, when viewed in historical context and fairly appraised, clearly runs counter to a tribe's later claims.	The court relied on this principle to justify applying the treaty's plain language to exclude lands that had been sold prior to the 1864 treaty, because nothing in the record showed a contrary understanding at treaty formation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the statutory definition of "Indian country" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which includes "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation."

The circuit court had found that Leaton Road was a right-of-way running through the Isabella Indian Reservation and therefore constituted Indian country, rendering state criminal jurisdiction over an enrolled tribal member void. The prosecution disputed that the arrest location was within Indian country and argued that lands within the described townships that had been sold prior to the 1864 treaty were never part of the original reservation.

The Court of Appeals examined the Treaty of October 18, 1864, noting that the treaty granted the Chippewas "all of the unsold lands within the six townships in Isabella County" (language reproduced in the opinion). The court observed that the parties had not presented evidence about treaty negotiations, so the court relied on the treaty's plain language and on the canon of treaty construction favoring tribes (as articulated in cited precedents).

Applying those principles, the court concluded that the treaty's reference to "unsold lands" indicated an intent to exclude lands previously sold and patented to non-Indians. Because the prosecution had documented that the location of the arrest was on land patented to non-Indians in July 1857 (purchased in 1854), the court determined the arrest did not occur on a right-of-way passing through Indian country.

The court therefore held that state courts retained jurisdiction to prosecute an enrolled tribal member for crimes committed on that land, and the circuit court's order quashing the information was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding: REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Implications:

The circuit court's order quashing the information was reversed, and the case was remanded for trial on all charges against defendant.
The court concluded, based on the treaty's plain language and the documentation that the specific parcel had been patented to non-Indians before the 1864 treaty, that the arrest location was not Indian country; therefore, state criminal jurisdiction was proper in this instance.
No broader implications or new legal rules were announced beyond the application of treaty-construction principles to the facts; the opinion notes that resolving the primary issue rendered moot the prosecution's second assignment of error concerning lands patented to Indians and subsequently sold to non-Indians.

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PEOPLE v BENNETT

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, a member of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian tribe, was arrested in Chippewa Township, Isabella County, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, MCL 257.625(6); MSA 9.2325(6). Defendant was also charged with impaired driving, third offense, MCL 257.625b(4); MSA 9.2325(2)(4), and driving with a suspended license, second offense, MCL 257.904(3); MSA 9.2604(3). Defendant moved in circuit court to quash the information on the ground that the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because he was arrested on land within the boundaries of the Isabella Indian reservation. The court granted defendant's motion to quash. The prosecution now appeals as of right the August 31, 1990, order quashing the information. We reverse and remand.

The sole issue before us is whether defendant was in Indian country. Indian country is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151, in pertinent part, as:

(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation. . . .

The circuit court found that "Leaton Road is a right-of-way running through the Isabella Indian Reservation, and is therefore, by definition, `Indian Country.' Since federal and tribal jurisdiction are exclusive in Indian Country, it is axiomatic that state criminal jurisdiction over an enrolled member of the tribe in Indian country, including rights-of-way therein, is void, according to the plain meaning of the statute."

The prosecution asserts that defendant was not in Indian country when he was arrested. Rather, the prosecution contends the location where defendant was arrested is outside the areas that are Indian country.

The prosecution first argues that land patented to non-Indians before the effective date of the treaties was never Indian country as defined by statute.

The Isabella reservation was established by the Treaty of October 18, 1864. That treaty provided, in part, that:

Article II. In consideration of the foregoing relinquishments, the United States hereby agree to set apart for the exclusive use, ownership, and occupancy of the said . . . Chippewas of Saginaw, Swan Creek, and Black River, all of the unsold lands within the six townships in Isabella County, reserved to said Indians by the treaty of August 2d 1855, aforesaid, and designated as follows, vis:

The north half of township fourteen, and townships fifteen and sixteen north, of range three west; the north half of township fourteen and township fifteen north, of range four west, and townships fourteen and fifteen north, of range five west.

The prosecution argues that any lands within the six described townships that were sold before the execution of the 1864 treaty were never part of the original Isabella reservation and, therefore, could not be considered Indian country for jurisdictional purposes. The prosecution has documented the fact that the area where defendant was arrested was patented to non-Indians in July 1857 pursuant to cash purchases made in 1854.

Indian treaties must be construed "so far as possible, in the sense in which the Indians understood them, and in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people." Choctaw Nation of Indians v United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432; 63 S Ct 672; 87 L Ed 877 (1943). "The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be considered as used only in the latter sense." Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 582; 8 L Ed 483 (1832). Ambiguities are to be construed in favor of the Indians. Oneida Co v Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247; 105 S Ct 1245; 84 L Ed 2d 169 (1985). Courts may not, however, "ignore plain language that, viewed in historical context and given a `fair appraisal,'. . . clearly runs counter to a tribe's later claims." Oregon Dep't of Fish Wildlife v Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 774; 105 S Ct 3420; 87 L Ed 2d 542 (1985).

In this case, the parties have not presented evidence of the negotiations surrounding the formation of the Treaty of October 18, 1864. However, examining the treaty itself, it appears that the parties intended for the previously sold lands to be excluded from the reservation, because the Chippewas were granted all the "unsold" lands within the six townships. Given the plain language of the treaty, and the lack of evidence to the contrary, we believe the Chippewas would have understood at the time of treaty formation that they were not permitted to settle on or own any lands previously patented to individuals. Choctaw Nation of Indians v United States, supra.

Therefore, defendant was not on a right of way passing through Indian country when he was arrested, and he was subject to criminal prosecution in state court.

Our resolution of this issue renders moot the prosecution's second assignment of error, that lands patented to Indians and subsequently sold to non-Indians are not Indian country.

We reverse the circuit court's order of August 31, 1990, and remand for trial on all charges. We do not retain jurisdiction.

PEOPLE v. BENNETT