Ordered that the appeal is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements.
In this case the order of protection has expired, and the determination of this appeal would have no direct effect upon the parties. Further, we find that the issuance of the order of protection in this case did not constitute a "`permanent and significant stigma' which might indirectly affect the appellant's status in potential future proceedings" (Matter of McClure v McClure, 176 A.D.2d 325, 326; Matter of Andrews v. Andrews, 168 A.D.2d 444; Matter of Gansburg v. Gansburg, 127 A.D.2d 766; see also, Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as academic. In any event, if we were to review the merits of the appeal, we would conclude that the evidence adduced at the hearing demonstrated that the granting of an order of protection was not improper (see, Matter of Leffingwell v. Leffingwell, 86 A.D.2d 929; see also, Merola v Merola, 146 A.D.2d 611; Kilmer v. Kilmer, 109 A.D.2d 1004; Besharov, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 842, at 194). Thompson, J.P., Rosenblatt, Lawrence and Santucci, JJ., concur.