Ordered that the appeal by Essential Electric Corp. is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, since it is not aggrieved by the order appealed from (see, CPLR 5511); and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
We agree with the Supreme Court that there are questions of fact as to whether the plaintiff proved a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1), and whether any alleged violation was a proximate cause of the accident. Accordingly, summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor was properly denied.
We also agree with the Supreme Court that both Executive Land Corporation and Red-Wing Products, Inc. were "owners" of the premises for purposes of Labor Law § 240 (1). Both the certificate of title and the building permit had been issued in the name of Executive Land Corporation, and although the deed was temporarily transferred to the Town of Islip Industrial Development Agency, this clearly constituted nothing more than a financing mechanism, not a genuine transfer of ownership (see, Collins v County of Monroe Indus. Dev. Agency, 167 A.D.2d 914, citing Matter of Erie County Indus. Dev. Agency v Roberts, 94 A.D.2d 532, 539, affd 63 N.Y.2d 810). Red-Wing Products, Inc., was likewise an "owner" within the meaning of the statute, inasmuch as it was the contract vendee of the premises, had access thereto, and was the party that had contracted to have the electrical work performed (see, DeFreece v Penny Bag, 137 A.D.2d 744).
The Supreme Court likewise correctly granted summary judgment to both Heartland Selling Corporation and Heartland Building Corporation, there being no evidence that either exercised any supervision or control over the electrical work in question (see, Russin v Picciano Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311; Amico v Park Ave. Plaza Co., 168 A.D.2d 391). Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Rosenblatt and Lawrence, JJ., concur.