TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON v. SALTEN, N.Y. App. Div., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a discovery dispute in which the defendant, Howard Salten, repeatedly obstructed the plaintiff, Town of Southampton, from obtaining his deposition. Despite a court-ordered deposition and supervision by a Judicial Hearing Officer, the defendant failed to appear. The court issued a conditional order that would strike the defendant's answer unless he appeared at a deposition scheduled for July 31, 1990. Three days before this deposition, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, with the motion returnable in November 1990. The defendant did not appear at the July 31 deposition, leading the court to strike his answer and enjoin him from initiating further actions against the plaintiff without prior court permission. The defendant subsequently moved to vacate the default based on his motion to dismiss, which the Supreme Court denied, prompting this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) automatically stayed the court-ordered deposition under CPLR 3214(b).
Whether the court properly exercised its discretion in striking the defendant's answer due to his failure to comply with discovery orders.
Whether the court's injunction preventing the defendant from commencing further actions without prior permission was within its equitable powers.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The defendant contended that the pending deposition was automatically stayed by operation of CPLR 3214(b) when he filed his motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211.
The defendant sought to vacate the default resulting from his failure to appear at the deposition, arguing that the dismissal of his answer was improper.

The opinion does not provide a detailed account of the respondent's arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Laverne v Incorporated Vil. of Laurel Hollow, 18 N.Y.2d 635, 638	A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 does not protect a defendant from dismissal of their answer for non-compliance.	The court relied on this precedent to reject the defendant's claim that the motion to dismiss stayed discovery and dismissal of his answer.
Reynolds Sec. v Underwriters Bank Trust Co., 44 N.Y.2d 568	Court's broad discretion to dismiss an answer for failure to comply with discovery orders.	The court affirmed the dismissal of the defendant's answer as a proper exercise of discretion given his willful non-compliance.
Moriates v Powertest Petroleum Co., 114 A.D.2d 888	Supports dismissal of pleadings for discovery violations.	Used to corroborate the court's discretionary power to strike the defendant's answer.
Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 A.D.2d 833	Reinforces dismissal of pleadings due to willful discovery non-compliance.	Further supported the court's decision to strike the answer.
Sassower v Signorelli, 99 A.D.2d 358	Equity powers of the court to enjoin litigants from commencing further actions without permission.	The court found the injunction against the defendant to be a proper exercise of equitable authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the defendant's motion to dismiss and found that it did not automatically stay discovery or protect him from dismissal of his answer. The defendant's repeated failure to comply with court-ordered depositions demonstrated a pattern of willful and contumacious conduct. Given these facts, the court exercised its broad discretion to strike the defendant's answer as a sanction for non-compliance. Additionally, the court held that the injunction preventing the defendant from initiating further proceedings without court approval was within its equitable powers and was neither improper nor an abuse of discretion. The court also considered and rejected other contentions raised by the defendant as either unpreserved or without merit.

Holding and Implications

The court's final decision was to affirm the order striking the defendant's answer and imposing an injunction, with costs awarded to the plaintiff. The ruling directly enforces compliance with discovery orders by affirming the court's authority to sanction non-compliant parties and to enjoin further litigation without prior permission. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the decision reinforces existing principles regarding discovery sanctions and equitable injunctions in litigation.

Show full summary ...

TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, Respondent, v. HOWARD SALTEN, Appellant.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Since the inception of this action, the defendant has continually thwarted the plaintiff's efforts to obtain the defendant's deposition, including failing to appear at a deposition ordered by the Judicial Hearing Officer appointed by the court to supervise discovery. Ultimately, in response to the plaintiff's cross motion to strike the defendant's answer, the court issued a conditional order granting the cross motion unless the defendant appeared for the next court-ordered deposition, scheduled for July 31, 1990.

Three days prior to the date set for this deposition, the defendant served, by mail, a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), returnable almost four months later on November 20, 1990. Thereafter, the defendant did not appear at the deposition scheduled for July 31, 1990. On August 3, 1990, the court struck the defendant's answer for failure to comply with the court's prior conditional order. The court also enjoined the defendant from commencing any further actions or proceedings against the plaintiff without first obtaining the specific permission of the Administrative Judge of the Supreme Court of the County of Suffolk.

On August 14, 1990, the defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 5015, to vacate his "default" in not appearing at the deposition scheduled for July 31, 1990. The Supreme Court denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant contends that when he brought the motion to dismiss the complaint, the impending deposition was automatically stayed by operation of CPLR 3214 (b).

The defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 did not in any way immunize the defendant from the dismissal of his answer (see, Laverne v Incorporated Vil. of Laurel Hollow, 18 N.Y.2d 635, 638). The record is replete with examples of the defendant's pattern of willful and contumacious behavior regarding the plaintiff's attempt to depose him. Under these circumstances, dismissal of the defendant's answer was within the broad discretion of the court (see, Reynolds Sec. v Underwriters Bank Trust Co., 44 N.Y.2d 568; Moriates v Powertest Petroleum Co., 114 A.D.2d 888; Battaglia v Hofmeister, 100 A.D.2d 833). Nor do we find that the granting of the injunction was beyond the equity powers of the court or otherwise improper (see, Sassower v Signorelli, 99 A.D.2d 358).

We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Eiber, J.P., Ritter, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.

TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON v. SALTEN