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Docket Number

(10691)

Attorney(S)

Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, was G. Douglas Nash, public defender, for the appellant (defendant). Lawrence J. Tytla, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was C. Robert Satti, Sr., state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Judges

FREEDMAN, J.

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Smart Summary

State of Connecticut v. Marvin Beasley

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant was charged by substitute information with the crime of murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a. After a jury trial in Superior Court (New London judicial district), the jury found the defendant not guilty of murder but guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-55(a)(3). The trial court sentenced the defendant to a twenty year term of imprisonment, the maximum statutory term. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court based the twenty year sentence on the murder charge for which he had been acquitted, thereby violating his rights to a jury trial and to due process. This court affirmed the judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court violated the defendant's rights to trial by jury and due process by imposing the statutory maximum sentence in a manner that punished him for the greater charge (murder) of which he was acquitted.
Whether the defendant's constitutional claim, though unpreserved at trial, may be reviewed under the State v. Golding standard (i.e., whether the record is adequate and the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The defendant argued that the trial court, in imposing the statutory maximum sentence, punished him not only for the manslaughter conviction but also for the greater charge of murder for which the jury acquitted him, thereby violating his rights to a jury trial and to due process.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989)	The standard for appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims: the claimant can prevail only if the record is adequate, the claim is of constitutional magnitude, and the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial.	The court applied Golding to determine whether the defendant's unpreserved claim could be reviewed. It concluded the record was adequate and the claim was of constitutional magnitude, but that the alleged constitutional violation did not clearly exist and did not clearly deprive the defendant of a fair trial; therefore the defendant could not prevail under Golding.
State v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 505 A.2d 1242 (1986)	Principles governing sentencing discretion: (1) a sentence within statutory limits is generally not subject to modification on appeal; (2) a sentencing judge has broad discretion and may consider matters not admissible at trial (including evidence related to indicted but untried crimes or charges for which a defendant was acquitted); and (3) as a matter of due process, information used at sentencing must have some minimal indicium of reliability, and the judge must have a reasonable, persuasive basis for relying on it.	The court relied on Huey to evaluate whether the trial judge acted within discretion and due process bounds in imposing the maximum sentence. Applying Huey, the court examined the sentencing record, concluded the judge considered only information with sufficient indicia of reliability and had a reasonable, persuasive basis for relying on that information, and therefore found no abuse of discretion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in several analytical steps:

Preservation and Standard for Review: The court noted the defendant did not properly preserve his constitutional claim at trial and therefore the claim was subject to review only under the Golding standard for unpreserved constitutional claims. The court found the record adequate for review and that the claim raised a constitutional question, but the alleged constitutional violation did not clearly exist and did not clearly deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Identification of the Basis for the Defendant's Claim: The court identified two remarks by the trial judge that the defendant relied on. The first remark was the judge's response to the victim's mother, stating that the jury, not the court, found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. The second was the judge's sentencing commentary expressing the judge's view that the jury had not found specific intent but that the judge believed the facts (shooting the victim five times in the back) demonstrated specific intent, and that those facts dictated imposition of the maximum penalty.
Applicable Sentencing Law and Due Process Constraint: The court cited State v. Huey to explain that a sentencing judge has broad discretion to consider matters beyond admissible trial evidence, including information related to acquitted charges, but that due process requires such information have a minimal indicium of reliability and a reasonable, persuasive basis for the sentencing judge to rely upon it.
Application to the Record: The court carefully examined the sentencing proceedings and concluded the trial judge considered only reliable information and possessed a reasonable and persuasive basis for relying on that information in fashioning the sentence. Because the information used met the reliability test and the judge acted within his sentencing discretion, the claimed constitutional violation did not clearly exist under Golding.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and upheld the twenty year sentence.

Implications:

The direct effect is that the defendant's conviction for manslaughter in the first degree and the trial court's imposition of the maximum twenty year sentence were affirmed.
The court found the sentence was within statutory limits, that the sentencing judge considered information that had a minimal indicium of reliability, and that the judge had a reasonable and persuasive basis for relying on that information. The court did not find a clear constitutional violation under the Golding standard.
This opinion does not announce or rely upon a novel legal rule beyond application of established Connecticut precedents (State v. Golding and State v. Huey) to the facts of this case; no broader new precedent was set by this decision beyond its application to the parties.

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARVIN BEASLEY

Convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant, who had been charged with the crime of murder, appealed to this court claiming that the trial court had based the defendant's twenty year sentence on the murder charge rather than on his manslaughter conviction. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant; the sentence given was within the statutory limits, the trial court considered only reliable information, and that court had a reasonable and persuasive basis for relying on that information.

FREEDMAN, J.

The defendant was charged with the crime of murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a. After a trial by a jury of twelve, the defendant was found not guilty of murder but was found guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-55(a)(3). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the defendant to be imprisoned in the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers for a term of twenty years, the maximum term allowed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the "trial court violated the defendant's rights to trial by jury and due process of law by sentencing him to the statutory maximum term of incarceration in order to punish him not only for the lesser included charge on which he was convicted but also for the greater charge on which he was acquitted." We disagree.

The defendant did not properly preserve this claim in the trial court. The defendant can prevail on an unpreserved constitutional claim only if all of the conditions of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), are met. Here, we conclude that although there is an adequate record to review the claim and it is a claim of constitutional magnitude, the alleged constitutional violation does not clearly exist and did not clearly deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See id., 239-40.

The defendant bases his claim on two remarks made by the trial court prior to imposing sentence. The first remark followed a statement to the trial court by the victim's mother expressing her disillusionment with the judicial system because the jury found the defendant not guilty of murder. The court responded to the victim's mother by stating that it appreciated her statement "very sincerely" and went on to say that "[i]t was not the court who found this man guilty of manslaughter. It was the jury."

The second remark, made by the trial court immediately prior to imposing sentence, was in pertinent part as follows: "Mr. Tytla [the state's attorney] was wondering about what was missing as far as the charge of murder is concerned. And I can tell you, Mr. Tytla, it appeared to me from what the jury said, and I discussed this with them, they didn't believe that there was a specific intent shown. My only reply to that is that shooting a man five times in the back is pretty specific as far as I'm concerned. I've had experience with guns in my service time. I've shot .45's on more than one occasion. And I don't believe that a .45 gun is going to go ta, ta, ta, ta, without somebody's finger being there. I may be paraphrasing Mr. Beasley's testimony, but that essentially is what he said. As far as this court is concerned, the facts and circumstances involved in this case, as I heard them in this courtroom, dictate that the court is to impose the maximum penalty."

"[I]f a sentence is within statutory limits it is generally not subject to modification by a reviewing court. . . . A sentencing judge has very broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the statutory limits and in exercising that discretion he [or she] may and should consider matters that would not be admissible at trial. . . . To arrive at a just sentence, a sentencing judge may consider information that would be inadmissible for the purpose of determining guilt . . . evidence of crimes for which the defendant was indicted but neither tried nor convicted . . . evidence bearing on charges for which the defendant was acquitted . . . and evidence of counts of an indictment which has been dismissed by the government." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 126, 505 A.2d 1242 (1986).

"The trial court's discretion, however, is not completely unfettered. As a matter of due process, information may be considered as a basis for a sentence only if it has some minimal indicium of reliability. . . . As long as the sentencing judge has a reasonable, persuasive basis for relying on the information which he [or she] uses to fashion his [or her] ultimate sentence, an appellate court should not interfere with his [or her] discretion." (Citation omitted.) Id., 127.

We have carefully examined the sentencing proceedings in this matter and conclude that the trial judge considered only information that met the test of reliability and that he had a reasonable and persuasive basis for relying on that information in fashioning the sentence. Consequently, the defendant's claim must fail because the alleged constitutional violation does not clearly exist. State v. Golding, supra, 240.

STATE v. BEASLEY