Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
Contrary to the plaintiff husband's contentions, we find that the award of interim counsel fees was a proper exercise of discretion. The defendant wife is a sales representative, earning approximately $18,000 per year. The husband has a net annual income of about $80,000 per year from a corporation in which he holds a 50% interest. Therefore, the wife's financial need and the parties' disparate incomes support the award (see, Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; Hausman v Hausman, 162 A.D.2d 590). Although the wife owns a stock portfolio valued at approximately $11,000, we have noted that indigency is not a prerequisite to an award of counsel fees and a party is not required to exhaust his or her own capital to qualify for an interim counsel fee award (see, Cole v Cole, 182 A.D.2d 738; Sharwell v Sharwell, 155 A.D.2d 434; Hyman v Hyman, 56 A.D.2d 337). Moreover, the awards of expert fees in the amount of $1,000 and $2,500 did not constitute improvident exercises of discretion (see, Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; Ahern v Ahern, 94 A.D.2d 53).
We further find that the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in denying the husband's motion for renewal based upon newly-discovered facts (see, Weiss v Flushing Natl. Bank, 176 A.D.2d 797). Sullivan, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.