Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The evidence adduced at the hearing sufficed to prove the allegations by the requisite preponderance of the evidence (see, Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]; Matter of Tammie Z., 66 N.Y.2d 1, 3-5). Out-of-court statements of a child relating to allegations of abuse are admissible at a fact-finding hearing and, if they are properly corroborated by evidence tending to support their reliability, may support a finding of abuse (see, Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vi]; Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112; Matter of Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d 532; Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. v Steven K., 176 A.D.2d 326). In the instant proceeding, the child made out-of-court statements relating to allegations of abuse to her father, two physicians, and the validator expert. The medical evidence and the validation testimony of an expert duly qualified in the area of child sexual abuse constituted sufficient corroboration of the allegations of abuse (see, Matter of Jesse S., 152 A.D.2d 581; Matter of Aryeh-Levi K., 134 A.D.2d 428; Matter of Kerri K., 135 A.D.2d 631; Matter of Linda K., 132 A.D.2d 149, 158-161).
Further, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the appellant's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (2) for a new hearing based on newly discovered evidence (see, Matter of Shaune L., 150 A.D.2d 689; National Hotel Mgt. Corp. v Shelton Towers Assocs., 111 A.D.2d 154). Evidence of the child's subsequent recantations did not mandate setting aside the finding of abuse (see, Teichner v WJ Holsteins, 161 A.D.2d 454; Trapp v American Trading Prod. Corp., 66 A.D.2d 515).
The limitations imposed upon the appellant's cross-examination of witnesses was a proper exercise of the Family Court's discretion. Sullivan, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.