Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
On appeal, the defendant contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, since the defendant failed to raise this issue in the County Court, his present contention is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Larry, 178 A.D.2d 282; People v Woods, 177 A.D.2d 731; People v Moore, 159 A.D.2d 521). In any event, after a consideration of the factors set forth in People v Taranovich ( 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445), we find that the defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we note that although the record is not completely developed, much of the delay resulted from the defendant's own actions, or circumstances which were not chargeable to the People (see, People v Thorpe, 183 A.D.2d 795; People v Rosado, 166 A.D.2d 544; People v Sirois, 92 A.D.2d 618). Moreover, there was no extended period of pretrial incarceration, and there is no indication that the defense was impaired by reason of the delay (see, People v Thorpe, supra; People v Dury, 179 A.D.2d 821; People v Tulloch, 179 A.D.2d 794; People v Rosado, supra).
We further reject the defendant's double jeopardy contention. The defendant raised the identical double jeopardy contention in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 prior to the entry of his plea of guilty (see, Matter of Moss v Vaughn, 164 A.D.2d 958), and this Court held that that contention was without merit. The doctrine of res judicata precludes him from raising the issue again on this appeal (see, People v Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234; People v Jontef, 97 A.D.2d 828). Sullivan, J.P., Balletta, Eiber and Santucci, JJ., concur.