Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
Viewing the evidence adduced at the trial under Indictment No. 843/89 in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see, Penal Law § 140.25). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15). The People's case consisted of both circumstantial and direct evidence. Therefore, contrary to the defendant's contention, the so-called "moral certainty" standard does not apply (see, People v Barnes, 50 N.Y.2d 375; cf., People v Benzinger, 36 N.Y.2d 29).
The court properly declined to suppress evidence, finding that the police legally stopped the defendant. A review of the record demonstrates that the police had reasonable suspicion for stopping the defendant on the street (see, People v Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181), and that this reasonable suspicion escalated to probable cause prior to his arrest (see, People v Hollman, supra; People v De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210).
We similarly find without merit the defendant's contention that a witness for the People participated in an unduly suggestive showup procedure. The identification of the defendant was the product of the witness' own efforts; no police identification procedures were necessary, and none, in fact, took place (see, People v Whisby, 48 N.Y.2d 834). In any event, we agree with the hearing court that the viewing which did take place was prompt, on-the-scene, and insured the reliability of the witness' identification of the defendant (see, People v Moore, 145 A.D.2d 510).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Balletta, J.P., Eiber, O'Brien and Santucci, JJ., concur.