JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
Jobe King DeShazo, III, appeals from the commission's denial of his application for compensation benefits. DeShazo contends that the commission erred in finding (1) that he was not lifting anything when he experienced back pain, and (2) that the medical evidence did not establish a causal connection between his work activity and his injury. We affirm the commission's decision.
The only testimonial evidence before the commission was given by DeShazo, the president of J. King DeShazo, III, Inc., a roofing company. On March 1, 1991, he performed labor for an absent sheet metal worker. He described the following activity and injury.
I was installing . . . [a metal] coping [over the top of a wall] and the coping was a fairly low to the roof maybe eight to twelve
inches above the floor of the roof and was physically moving, no, I had just went down to fit into, I brought a piece of metal over and I fit it and cut it and had brought, picked it back up and spun around when I just, just kind of froze, I couldn't straighten up and, you know, my back, I just felt a very sharp pain in my back.
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[I] let the metal down and actually just stopped and kind of dropped to my knees for a minute and then I went over, there was a little raised section on the roof, I went back and I laid across the roof.
Based upon an evaluation of DeShazo's oral testimony and the other documents in the record, the deputy commissioner disbelieved DeShazo's testimony and found that the evidence failed to prove DeShazo was lifting anything when he felt back pain. The commission affirmed that finding and stated:
Although [DeShazo] testified that he had cut a piece of coping weighing approximately thirty pounds and was holding it when he straightened up, this is the first indication of his lifting anything. He had given a description of his alleged accident in the Employer's First Report, the report of Landin, Inc. and in his recorded statement. These reports do not mention the claimant was holding a piece of coping.
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The Deputy Commissioner did not believe [DeShazo] was lifting coping when he felt his pain, and we agree with his conclusion that [DeShazo] was doing nothing more than arising from a bending position at the time he felt pain.
The principle is well established that if the commission's findings of fact are supported by credible evidence, they are conclusive and binding on appeal. Code § 65.2-706; Caskey v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 225 Va. 405, 411, 302 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1983). The First Report of Accident states that DeShazo was "bent over and could not straighten up" when the injury occurred. DeShazo's report to his insurer stated: "I went to move and noticed pain in the lower back. I attempted to straighten upright and could not do so." In addition, in the recorded interview with the agent of the insurer, DeShazo said that he "went to stand from installing the coping and notice[d] pains going down my right leg." Thus, none of the documentary evidence in the record contains any indication that DeShazo was lifting an object when he felt pain.
The determination of the credibility of witnesses is a matter that generally is committed to the purview of the fact finder.Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 381, 363 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1987). Although this Court has said that the "commission may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence of unimpeached witnesses, which is not inherently incredible and not inconsistent with other facts in the record," Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va. App. 357, 361, 412 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1991), this case does not fit within that rule. Where the witness's testimony is inconsistent with credible facts in the record, the finder of fact does not err in disregarding the witness's testimony. Because the commission's decision is based upon the documentary evidence in the record and the deputy commissioner's evaluation of DeShazo's testimony, we conclude that the decision is supported by credible evidence.
However, whether DeShazo had the metal coping in his hand when he experienced the pain is not dispositive of the case. See Grove v. Allied Signal, Inc., ___ Va. App. ___, ___, 421 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1992) (the identifiable incident consisted of being "in a crouched position several feet off the floor when . . . reach[ing] for the pipe"); Richard E. Brown, Inc. v. Caporaletti, 12 Va. App. 242, 244, 402 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1991) ("the identifiable incident [consisted] of straightening up after working in a bent over position"). The question the commission had to decide was whether DeShazo's injury arose out of his employment. Grove, ___ Va. App. at ___, 421 S.E.2d at 33. To establish a compensable injury, the evidence must prove "`a causal connection between the claimant's injury and the conditions under which the employer requires the work to be performed.'" Id. at ___, 421 S.E.2d at 34 (quoting RT Investments, Ltd. v. Johns, 228 Va. 249, 252, 321 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1984)).
The Supreme Court has said that a compensable injury is not proved merely because the evidence established that the employee was in the employer's place of business when a movement occurred and an injury resulted. See County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 184-85, 376 S.E.2d 73, 75-76 (1989);United Parcel Serv. of America v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 259, 336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1985) (per curiam). See also Plumb Rite Plumbing Service v. Barbour, 8 Va. App. 482, 484, 382 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1989). The evidence must prove the "causative danger . . . had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and . . . flowed from that source as a rational consequence." Johns, 228 Va. at 253, 321 S.E.2d at 289. "`But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment.'" Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938) (quotingIn re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 499, 102 N.E. 697, 697 (1913)).
The record established that DeShazo went to the emergency room five days after he alleged that he suffered sharp pain. The emergency room report related no history concerning the injury's onset. On the sixth day, DeShazo visited Dr. Irby, whose report simply stated, "injured back at work while roofing." A week later, DeShazo saw Dr. Allen, whose report noted two previous back injuries, including "a small linear fracture of L3 in 1986." Dr. Allen's report related DeShazo's then current complaint as follows: "Friday he awoke, putting coping on a roof, could not get around." A December 1991 report from Dr. Allen stated that the "injury occurred while [DeShazo] was putting the coping on the roof on the first of March necessitating his surgery." Based upon these reports and its finding that DeShazo "was doing nothing more than arising from a bending position at the time he felt pain," the commission found that the "medical evidence does not establish causation" for the herniated disc that DeShazo suffered. To the extent that there is conflict in the medical evidence, "the finding of the commission as to causation is binding on appeal." Estate of Montgomery v. City of Portsmouth Police Dep't, 4 Va. App. 525, 529, 358 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1987). The commission found no proof of causation in these reports.
We conclude that credible evidence supports the findings of the commission. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of benefits.
Affirmed.