JAMES L. KIMBLER, Judge.
The petitioner, Steven R. Justice, filed a complaint alleging that the action of the respondent in suspending his driving license for refusal to take a test to determine the alcohol concentration in his body was improper. The action was brought pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(F).
At an implied consent suspension hearing, the issues before the court are limited to (1) whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or both; (2) whether the petitioner was placed under arrest; (3) whether he refused to submit to a test when requested by the officer; and (4) whether he was advised of the consequences of such refusal.
In the present case, the petitioner was initially arrested on a charge of domestic violence pursuant to R.C. 2919.25(A). While he was being booked into the Wayne County Jail on that charge, he was asked to perform field tests by the Wayne County Sheriff's Deputy who had arrested him.
After performing the field tests, he was then given a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Following the administration of the field tests and the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, he was then asked to submit to a chemical test to determine the level of alcohol concentration in his breath, blood, and/or urine. He refused all such tests. Prior to being asked to take the tests, the officer read the implied consent form, which is required by law, to the petitioner.
That form contains language to the effect that the person who is being asked to take the test is under arrest for operating under the influence of alcohol. The reading of that form was the first time the petitioner was told that he was under arrest for operating under the influence of alcohol.
After that form was read to him, he refused to take any tests and the Bureau of Motor Vehicles suspended his operator's license for a period of one year.
An arrest depends upon the existence of four elements. They are (1) an intent to arrest; (2) under real or pretended authority; (3) accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person; and (4) which is so understood by the person being arrested. State v. Barker (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 135, 7 O.O.3d 213, 372 N.E.2d 1324.
In this case, the court finds that at the time the petitioner was asked to take the chemical tests by the officer, he was not under arrest for violating R.C. 4511.19. The reading of the implied consent form did not place the petitioner under arrest because he was not actually or constructively seized or detained by the reading of that form. He had already been "seized" for the offense of domestic violence. The reading of the form did not amount to a "re-seizure" of the petitioner for the separate offense of operating under the influence.
The implied consent law applies only to people who are arrested for the offense of operating under the influence of alcohol, drugs of abuse, or the combined effect of both. See R.C. 4511.191(A). Therefore, if a person is arrested for violating a different provision of the law and is asked to take a chemical test to determine whether he or she has a prohibited concentration of alcohol in a bodily substance, a refusal cannot trigger the one-year suspension mandated by R.C. 4511.191. Cf. Koch v. Dollison (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 141, 2 OBR 155, 440 N.E.2d 1362.
Therefore, the court holds that the petitioner has shown error by the bureau in suspending his license for one year pursuant to R.C. 4511.191. The court therefore orders that the one-year suspension shall not be imposed. Costs taxed to the Treasury of Medina County.
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED.
So ordered.