Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the single-count indictment amplified by the amended bill of particulars was duplicitous inasmuch as it charged him with the commission of multiple crimes (see, CPL 200.30, 200.50 Crim. Proc. [3]), has not been preserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Palmer, 184 A.D.2d 534; People v. Lopez, 175 A.D.2d 267, 268; People v Barrett, 166 A.D.2d 657, 658). In any event, this claim is without merit. Although the amended bill of particulars asserted that two courses of conduct, i.e., a series of assaults and failure to obtain medical care, caused the death of the 3-month-old infant, this conduct was all part of the same incident on October 7, 1988. Depraved indifference murder, as defined in Penal Law § 125.25 (2), does not necessarily contemplate the performance of a single act but, rather, is a crime that by its nature may be committed by one act or by multiple acts and thus, readily permits characterization as a continuing offense (see, People v. Ribowsky, 77 N.Y.2d 284, 289; People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410). Therefore, we find that the indictment, which permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of depraved indifference murder upon a combination of acts or in one of two alternative ways, was proper (see, People v. Keindl, supra, at 421; see also, People v. Wong, 182 A.D.2d 98).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the evidence, including evidence that the defendant hit, threw, and dropped the infant before squeezing her neck, resulting in her death caused by a combination of multiple bruises and traumatic asphyxiation, overwhelmingly proved that he was guilty of depraved indifference murder (see, Penal Law § 125.25). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
We further find that the sentence imposed was neither harsh nor excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Sullivan, J.P., Miller, Ritter and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.