DEAN STRAUSBAUGH, Judge.
On the night of November 17, 1989, plaintiff, Lonnie Hicks, his two sons, and his girlfriend traveled the rural roads of Clark County, Ohio in plaintiff's red pickup truck. During their trek, one of plaintiff's young sons continually flashed a high powered spotlight into the open fields adjacent to the roads.
Doug Erwin, who resides in the area of plaintiff's travels, observed from his home the spotlight being shined from plaintiff's truck into the open fields. Believing that the spotlight was being used to "spotlight" deer, Erwin placed a telephone call to John Cody, a game protector in the wildlife section of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources ("ODNR"), and reported the spotlighting.
Cody made a radio transmission regarding the spotlighting. David Klopstein, a park ranger at Buck Creek State Park, received the radio transmission and proceeded to drive on the roads surrounding Buck Creek State Park. Klopstein spotted plaintiff's pickup truck, and then made a radio transmission reporting the sighting. Klopstein then stopped plaintiff's vehicle and informed plaintiff that there was reasonable suspicion to believe he was spotlighting deer, a violation of R.C. 1533.161.
Cody and Harold Blackwood, an ODNR enforcement agent, arrived at the scene of the stop. A search of plaintiff's truck was conducted. During the search, a spotlight and a pistol were discovered. In lieu of an arrest, plaintiff was issued a summons for allegedly spotlighting deer.
On March 7, 1990, plaintiff with his attorney, Charles Ricketts, appeared in Clark County Municipal Court to be tried on the spotlighting charge. The court finds that before the trial commenced, Assistant City Prosecutor Al Stewart, on his own volition, dismissed the spotlighting charge. Later the same day, Stewart, on his own volition, filed a complaint against plaintiff with the municipal court clerk regarding the gun found in his pickup truck on the night of November 17, 1989. A warrant for plaintiff's arrest was subsequently issued by the municipal court clerk. Cody and Blackwood were directed by the clerk to execute the arrest warrant.
On March 7, 1990, Cody and Blackwood were unsuccessful in their attempts to execute the arrest warrant. On the morning of March 8, 1990, plaintiff's attorney was successful in securing a recognizance bond, and, thus, getting the arrest warrant rescinded. Instead of following common practice and informing the Clark County Sheriff that the arrest warrant had been rescinded, the clerk left a message regarding the rescission on Cody's telephone answering machine located at his residence.
On March 8, 1990, Cody did not call his residence to check his phone messages. The court finds that Cody and Blackwood called the sheriff's office three times and ascertained each time that the arrest warrant was valid. On the afternoon of March 8, 1990, Cody and Blackwood were successful in executing the warrant and plaintiff was arrested. In the course of transporting plaintiff to the Clark County Jail, the court finds that Blackwood called the sheriff's office and was informed that the arrest warrant was still valid.
After arriving at the Clark County Jail, Cody and Blackwood turned custody of plaintiff over to the sheriff. Cody and Blackwood were still at the jail when plaintiff placed a phone call to his attorney who informed plaintiff, and then Blackwood, that the arrest warrant had been rescinded earlier that day. After being informed of such, Cody went to the clerk's office to verify that the arrest warrant had in fact been rescinded. At the clerk's office, Cody was informed that the arrest warrant had been rescinded that morning.
Cody and Blackwood left without informing the personnel at the jail that the arrest warrant had been rescinded. Plaintiff remained in jail for three hours until he was released pursuant to a $1,000 bond that was posted by his brother. The $1,000 was later returned to plaintiff's brother.
On November 13, 1990, plaintiff filed the above-captioned action. On January 11, 1993, this matter came on for trial regarding the issues of liability and damages.
During the course of trial, plaintiff specifically set forth that he was not claiming a right to relief based on false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. Plaintiff asserted that he had a right to relief based on the intentional misconduct and negligence of Cody and Blackwood. More specifically, plaintiff asserts that by making no attempt to get him released from jail after they had knowledge that the arrest warrant was invalid, Cody and Blackwood engaged in intentional misconduct, and their failure to discover that the arrest warrant had been rescinded was a result of negligence.
The court finds that Cody and Blackwood did not engage in intentional misconduct when they made no attempt to get plaintiff released from jail after they discovered that the arrest warrant was invalid. Cody and Blackwood merely performed the role of process servers. Once they turned custody of plaintiff over to the sheriff, their mission was complete. Any further detention of plaintiff or proceedings regarding plaintiff were matters under the direction of the sheriff or the municipal court.
The court further finds that Cody and Blackwood were not negligent for failing to discover that the arrest warrant had been rescinded. In a claim predicated on negligence, plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a duty, the breach of that duty, and injury resulting proximately therefrom. Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 21 O.O.3d 177, 423 N.E.2d 467.
Plaintiff asserts that Cody and Blackwood had a duty to not only check with the sheriff to verify that the arrest warrant was valid, but also to check with the clerk of municipal court. Plaintiff continued that if this would have been done, Cody and Blackwood would have discovered that the arrest warrant had been rescinded. The court finds that the law in Ohio does not support such a proposition. Once an arrest warrant is issued, the process server has no duty to go back to the issuer to verify that warrant is still valid prior to execution. Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh (1918), 97 Ohio St. 171, 178-180, 119 N.E. 451, 453-454. To place such a duty on process servers would paralyze police administration in this state. Id. at 179, 119 N.E. at 453.
In view of the above, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has a right to relief. Accordingly, the court hereby renders judgment for defendant.
Judgment for defendant.
DEAN STRAUSBAUGH, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.