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Docket Number

Docket No. 130534.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Carl J. Marlinga, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert J. Berlin, Chief Appellate Lawyer, and Richard J. Goodman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Robert H. Roether, for the defendant.

Judges

SHEPHERD, P.J.

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Smart Summary

People v. Miller, Docket No. 130534 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1993)

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant was charged with second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, for the death of Lisa Marie Eagling resulting from an automobile collision on March 23, 1989. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553, and was sentenced to a prison term of eight to fifteen years. Defendant appealed as of right. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting, under MRE 404(b), testimony regarding defendant's prior occasions of reckless driving while intoxicated.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defense motion for a directed verdict on the second-degree murder charge because of insufficient evidence of the requisite intent (malice).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

The trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony under MRE 404(b) about prior occasions when defendant drove recklessly while intoxicated.
The trial court erred in denying a directed verdict on the second-degree murder charge because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant possessed the necessary intent (malice) for that offense.

The People's (Prosecution) Position

The testimony of Debra Prewitt about six prior occasions when defendant drove recklessly after arguing with the decedent provided substantial evidence that defendant committed the prior acts.
The prior acts were admissible under MRE 404(b) to show motive and intent — specifically, that defendant drove recklessly on the night in question because he was angry and wanted to punish the victim.
The prior-act evidence was material because intent (malice) was an element the prosecution had to prove and was contested by the defense.
The probative value of the prior-act testimony was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; without it, defendant could mischaracterize his state of mind and portray the collision as an unfortunate mistake.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence supported a finding of malice (willful and wanton disregard), justifying submission of the second-degree murder charge to the jury.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Rockwell, 188 Mich. App. 405, 410; 470 N.W.2d 673 (1991)	Standard for finding an abuse of discretion: reversal only if an unprejudiced person would conclude there was no justification for the trial court's ruling.	The court applied this standard in reviewing the trial court's decision to admit prior-act testimony under MRE 404(b) and concluded there was no abuse of discretion.
People v. Golochowicz, 413 Mich. 298, 307-309; 319 N.W.2d 518 (1982)	Four-part test for admitting evidence of a prior similar act under MRE 404(b): (1) substantial evidence defendant committed the act; (2) special quality tending to prove identity, motive, intent, absence of mistake/accident, scheme/plan, opportunity/preparation/knowledge; (3) materiality of one or more factors; and (4) probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.	The court applied each Golochowicz prong and found they were satisfied: Prewitt's testimony established the prior acts; the acts tended to show motive/intent; intent was material; and probative value outweighed unfair prejudice.
People v. Engelman, 434 Mich. 204; 453 N.W.2d 656 (1990)	Cited as related authority concerning MRE 404(b) (no specific rule excerpted in the opinion).	Referenced as additional authority in the court's discussion of MRE 404(b) standards.
People v. Vasquez, 129 Mich. App. 691, 694; 341 N.W.2d 873 (1983)	Definition and explanation of "malice" for second-degree murder: intent to kill, to cause great bodily harm, or doing an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that death or great bodily harm will result.	The court used Vasquez to explain that defendant's reckless driving on prior occasions and on the night in question evidenced willful and wanton disregard (malice) and supported submission of the murder charge.
People v. Morris, 139 Mich. App. 550, 557; 362 N.W.2d 830 (1984)	Principle concerning balancing probative value against unfair prejudice under MRE 403/MRE 404(b).	The court cited Morris in concluding that Prewitt's testimony's probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
People v. Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 368; 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979), cert. denied 449 U.S. 885 (1980)	Directed verdict standard: when ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.	The court applied the Hampton standard and determined that, viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution, sufficient evidence of malice existed to deny the directed verdict motion and submit second-degree murder to the jury.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the two principal issues in sequence.

On admission of prior-act testimony under MRE 404(b):

The court explained the abuse-of-discretion standard (People v. Rockwell) and stated that reversal requires that an unprejudiced person would conclude there was no justification for the trial court's ruling.
The court quoted MRE 404(b) and applied the Golochowicz four-part test for admitting evidence of prior similar acts.
Under the first Golochowicz prong, the court found substantial evidence that defendant committed prior reckless-driving acts because Debra Prewitt testified to six such occasions.
Under the second prong, the court found a "special quality" — the prior acts tended to show motive and intent (that defendant drove recklessly out of anger to punish or intimidate the victim), which tended to prove he acted similarly on the night in question.
Under the third prong, the court found the prior acts material because intent (malice) was contested by the defense and thus was an issue in the case.
Under the fourth prong, relying on People v. Morris, the court concluded the probative value of the testimony was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court reasoned that without the evidence the defendant could portray himself as having merely made an unfortunate mistake, whereas the testimony made it more likely the truth would be revealed.
On balance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior-act evidence.

On the directed verdict (sufficiency of evidence of intent/malice):

The court applied the Hampton standard for directed verdicts, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence of malice: the defendant's reckless driving evidenced a willful and wanton disregard of the likelihood that death or great bodily harm could result (as articulated in Vasquez).
Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the directed verdict and submitting the second-degree murder charge to the jury.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Implications and direct effects:

The conviction (jury verdict of involuntary manslaughter and sentence of eight to fifteen years) was upheld.
The court concluded the trial court properly admitted prior-act evidence under MRE 404(b) and properly denied the directed verdict motion because sufficient evidence existed to permit a jury to find malice.
The opinion does not announce a new rule of law; it applies established Michigan precedents (cited above) to the facts of this case and does not discuss broader implications beyond the direct effect on the parties.

Affirmed.

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PEOPLE v MILLER

SHEPHERD, P.J.

Defendant was originally charged with second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, for the death of Lisa Marie Eagling as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile collision on March 23, 1989. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553, and sentenced to a prison term of eight to fifteen years. Defendant now appeals as of right, and we affirm.

Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting under MRE 404(b) testimony regarding defendant's reckless driving on prior occasions. We disagree.

We will find an abuse of discretion only if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts upon which the trial court made its decision, would conclude that there was no justification for the ruling made. People v Rockwell, 188 Mich. App. 405, 410; 470 N.W.2d 673 (1991).

MRE 404(b) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.

Evidence of a prior similar act may be admitted under MRE 404(b) where: (1) there is substantial evidence that the defendant committed the similar act; (2) there is some special quality of the act that tends to prove the defendant's identity or the motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, scheme, plan, or system, and opportunity, preparation, and knowledge; (3) one or more of these factors are material to the defendant's guilt of the charged offense; and (4) the probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich. 298, 307-309; 319 N.W.2d 518 (1982); see also People v Engelman, 434 Mich. 204; 453 N.W.2d 656 (1990).

In the case at bar, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of prior occasions when defendant drove recklessly while intoxicated. First, there was substantial evidence that defendant committed the prior acts. Debra Prewitt testified about six prior occasions when defendant drove his car recklessly after arguing with Lisa Eagling in order to punish or intimidate her.

Second, the prior acts were introduced by the prosecutor to show that defendant drove recklessly on the night of March 23, 1989, because he was angry with Lisa Eagling and wanted to punish her. After arguing with Lisa because she wanted to leave a party, defendant, though intoxicated, took her home, speeding down Nine Mile Road in Warren, straddling lanes, and running red lights before colliding with another vehicle that was lawfully proceeding through an intersection.

Furthermore, defendant's reckless driving on previous occasions was material under the third prong of the Golochowicz test in showing that defendant was guilty of second-degree murder. Under MRE 404(b), the word "material" means that one of the listed factors in the rule has been made an issue in the case by one of the parties or is a contested element of the offense or of the defense. In this case, the prosecutor was required to prove intent and the defendant raised lack of intent as a defense. The state of mind of the defendant was, therefore, material under MRE 404(b).

To establish the elements of second-degree murder, the prosecution must show "malice," a mental state consisting of "the intent to kill, to cause great bodily harm, or to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm." People v Vasquez, 129 Mich. App. 691, 694; 341 N.W.2d 873 (1983). Here, defendant's reckless driving on these prior occasions indicated that he wilfully and wantonly disregarded the likelihood that death or great bodily harm could result on the night in question. Id., pp 694-695.

Finally, the probative value of Prewitt's testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Morris, 139 Mich. App. 550, 557; 362 N.W.2d 830 (1984). Granted, the evidence in question is damaging to defendant. However, in the absence of the evidence, defendant would be able to falsely portray himself as the loving, caring boyfriend who simply made an unfortunate mistake. On balance, the admission of the contested evidence has a greater probability of leading to the truth than would its exclusion.

Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in denying a defense motion for a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence that defendant possessed the necessary intent to warrant the submission of the second-degree murder charge to the jury. We again disagree.

When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 368; 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979), cert den 449 U.S. 885 (1980).

In this case, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, showed the element of malice. Defendant's reckless driving on the night in question evidenced a wilful and wanton disregard of the likelihood that he would cause death or great bodily harm. Vasquez, supra, pp 694-695.