Ordered that the cross appeal is dismissed as abandoned; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the defendants are awarded one bill of costs.
The plaintiff was injured on March 6, 1985, while he was engaged in "backfilling * * * performed to strengthen [a] dock and bulkhead". His job was to guide a bucket which was suspended from a crane mounted on a floating scow. At one point, the bucket struck the plaintiff's ankle and caused him to suffer a bimalleolar fracture.
We agree with the Supreme Court that Federal maritime law applies to this case pursuant to the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act of 1948 (46 U.S.C. § 740; see, Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206; Torres v. City of New York, 177 A.D.2d 97, 101-102; Huser v. Santa Fe Pomeroy, 513 F.2d 1298; Tucker v Calmar S.S. Corp., 457 F.2d 440; Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657, cert denied 379 U.S. 913; Annotation, Admiralty Extension Act, 14 ALR Fed 664, § 24). Contrary to the plaintiff's argument on appeal, we find that there was a sufficient nexus between the happening of this accident and a traditional maritime activity, i.e., the repairing of a dock (see, e.g., Torres v. City of New York, supra; Duncanson-Harrelson v. Director, Off. of Workers' Compensation, 644 F.2d 827; Duncanson-Harrelson v. Director, Off. of Workers' Compensation Programs, 686 F.2d 1336, vacated on other grounds 462 U.S. 1101, on remand 713 F.2d 462; Wistrom v. Duluth, Missabe Iron Range Ry. Co., 437 N.W.2d 730 [Minn]). Contrary to the plaintiff's additional argument, we conclude that the existence of Federal maritime jurisdiction in this case precludes application of the New York Labor Law (§§ 200, 240 [1]; § 241 [6]; see, Torres v. City of New York, supra; Stuto v. Coastal Dry Dock Repair Corp., 153 A.D.2d 937). Accordingly, the order appealed from is affirmed insofar as appealed from. Bracken, J.P., Eiber, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.