Defendant's contention that the evidence does not support a conviction for assault in the first degree because the complainant's injuries were not adequately established is without merit. Whether the complainant's injury was caused by defendant was for the jury, which had the right to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the opinion of any expert (People v. Justice, 173 A.D.2d 144, 146, citing People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 77). Thus, the jury was not bound to accept the opinion of defendant's expert.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the court did not abuse its discretion when, after inquiry, it accepted a juror's assurance that he could be impartial, notwithstanding a medical condition of a nature which might make him sympathetic to the complainant. In light of the juror's assurance it cannot be said that he was "grossly unqualified" within the meaning of CPL 270.35 (People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290). Upon review of the record, we find no reason to disturb the jury's determination of credibility.
Also without merit is defendant's contention that both the cross-examination of his witnesses and the summation were improper. The mere staleness of a witness' prior conviction is not, alone, reason to preclude impeachment (see, People v Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 200). The remainder of the cross-examination claimed to be prejudicial was proper because the record reveals that the prosecutor had a good faith basis for the questions (People v. Sealy, 167 A.D.2d 362, 363, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 843). The portions of the summation objected to were either proper response to the defense summation or the object of the court's curative instructions, and do not warrant reversal.
We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find them lacking in merit.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Wallach, Kupferman and Rubin, JJ.