Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that he was denied his rights to confrontation, to effective cross-examination, and to present a defense by the trial court's ruling limiting the scope and extent of cross-examination of the arresting officer. Although proof aimed at establishing a motive to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground, a trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, properly exclude such proof where it is too remote or speculative (see, People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 57; People v. Stewart, 188 A.D.2d 626; People v. Arthur, 186 A.D.2d 661; People v. McKnight, 144 A.D.2d 702, 703; People v. Samuels, 119 A.D.2d 706). Moreover, cross-examination aimed at establishing a possible reason to fabricate must proceed upon some goodfaith basis (see, People v. Hudy, supra, at 57; People v. Stewart, supra; People v. Folk, 145 A.D.2d 505; People v. McKnight, supra). A review of the record indicates that the excluded line of questioning, attempting to establish that the arresting officer fabricated his post-arrest report and the defendant's post-arrest inculpatory statement in order to gain favor with the superior officers on his new assignment, was purely speculative and lacked any factual basis. Accordingly, the court properly exercised its discretion in limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of the arresting officer.
We also find that the sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Sullivan, J.P., Rosenblatt, Lawrence and O'Brien, JJ., concur.