The primary issue on this appeal is whether, under CPLR former 203 (b) (5), petitioner's filing with the County Clerk, on January 11, 1991, of a notice of petition brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 was sufficient to interpose the claim so as to render petitioner's subsequent service of the petition itself upon respondent within 60 days timely.
It is clear that at the time of this proceeding, the 60 day extension provided for in CPLR former 203 (b) (5) applied to article 78 proceedings (Matter of Laureano v Grimes, 179 A.D.2d 602, 603). In this case, we find that the notice of petition, which clearly described the administrative action which was contested, the grounds upon which redress was sought and the requested relief, was, for the purposes herein, the functional equivalent of a petition (see, Matter of Gryska v Chemung County Elmira Sewer Dist., 149 A.D.2d 849, 850, n 1, citing Matter of Marmo v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 134 A.D.2d 260, 260-261). It therefore constituted appropriate process sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CPLR former 203 (b) (5) (cf., Matter of Long Is. Citizens Campaign v County of Nassau, 165 A.D.2d 52). The order dismissing the petition as untimely should therefore be reversed.
Concur — Ellerin, J.P., Kupferman, Ross and Kassal, JJ.