There are no rigid standards governing the due diligence requirement for substituted service pursuant to CPLR 308 (4) (Barnes v City of New York, 51 N.Y.2d 906, 907). We cannot say that the IAS Court's upholding of such service herein is unsupported by the record.
Ex parte orders are not appealable (Dowd v Dowd, 164 A.D.2d 752, 754). In any event, were we to consider the arguments defendant makes against the receivership, we would find them to be lacking in merit.
Defendant's substantive defenses are barred by an enforceable merger clause in the agreement (see, BNY Fin. Corp. v Clare, 172 A.D.2d 203, 205), and there is no triable issue of fact as to fraud in any event. Under the well-established standards governing a motion for summary judgment (see, Garcia v J.C. Duggan, Inc., 180 A.D.2d 579, 580), the record supports the judgment granted in favor of plaintiff.
The plain language of the mortgage allows recourse against any of defendant's property, wherever situated. Section 14 of the accompanying guaranty is not inconsistent, and incorporates the language of the mortgage by reference.
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments, and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Milonas, J.P., Ellerin, Ross, Kassal and Rubin, JJ.