Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's delay in disclosing Rosario material is without merit. Although the trial proceedings had already commenced and the relevant witness had already testified, the defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the People's late disclosure (see, People v Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 62). The defense counsel was given a one-day continuance and the People's witness was made available for the defense counsel to conduct further cross-examination. Thus, the defendant has not demonstrated that he suffered any prejudicial effect from the People's tardy disclosure (see generally, People v Forrest, 163 A.D.2d 213). Similarly devoid of merit is the defendant's contention that the show-up identification procedure, conducted within 15 minutes of the robbery and at the scene of the arrest, was unduly suggestive. Given the spatial and temporal proximity between the identification and the crime and subsequent arrest, we conclude that the show-up procedure was within the permissible bounds of the governing legal principles and devoid of any undue suggestiveness (see, People v Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 544; People v Sanchez, 178 A.D.2d 567; People v Williams, 150 A.D.2d 821).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit (see generally, People v Chaitin, 61 N.Y.2d 683; People v Bragg, 176 A.D.2d 464, 466; People v Moore, 148 A.D.2d 754, 755; cf., People v Puglisi, 44 N.Y.2d 748, 750). Mangano, P.J., Bracken, Sullivan and Lawrence, JJ., concur.