Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
We find that the court did not err when it permitted the presentment agency to cross-examine the appellant as to whether he committed certain specific criminal acts, as the agency had a good faith basis for the questions (see, Badr v Hogan, 75 N.Y.2d 629; People v De Pasquale, 54 N.Y.2d 693; Richardson, Evidence § 498 [Prince 10th ed]). Whether the probative worth of evidence of specific criminal acts on the issue of credibility outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice is a matter for the hearing court (see, People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 375), and we find that the court's determination was not an improvident exercise of its discretion. We note that the court's ruling did not discourage the appellant from testifying. Contrary to the appellant's contention, Family Court Act § 344.1 (1) is not implicated here, as the appellant did not deny committing the acts, and the agency did not attempt to present independent proof of these acts.
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit (see, People v McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, cert denied sub nom. Waters v New York, 446 U.S. 942; People v Julian, 41 N.Y.2d 340). Lawrence, J.P., Eiber, O'Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.