Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the People failed to prove his identity as the person who sold cocaine to an undercover police officer on March 15, 1989. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). The issue of the discrepancy between the defendant's appearance and the description of the seller recorded by the police was presented to the jury. Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt is not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
We disagree with the defendant's contention that the trial court improperly limited the cross-examination of certain prosecution witnesses. The scope of cross-examination rests largely in the sound discretion of the court (see, People v Mandel, 48 N.Y.2d 952, cert denied 446 U.S. 949; People v Quevas, 178 A.D.2d 441; People v Holmes, 138 A.D.2d 630), and we find that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion. Finally, there is no merit to the contention that the court's instructions to the jury diluted the People's burden of proof. Sullivan, J.P., O'Brien, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.