The IAS Court properly concluded that the commencement of the action for false arrest and imprisonment was timely as a result of a statutory stay of commencement. An action under Public Housing Law § 157 incorporates General Municipal Law § 50-h (5), which provides that "[w]here a demand for examination has been served * * * no action shall be commenced * * * unless the claimant has duly complied with such demand for [pre-suit] examination." Under CPLR 204 (a), when the commencement of an action is stayed by such a statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not excluded from the period of limitation. Here, plaintiff received a demand for examination on February 27, 1990, and the examination was conducted on April 19, 1990. In light of this 52 day tolling period, service of the summons and complaint 50 days after the 1 year statute of limitations under CPLR 215 (3) would have expired was timely (see, Serravillo v New York City Tr. Auth., 51 A.D.2d 1027, affd 42 N.Y.2d 918). We note also that the proposed cause of action for assault and battery, which the IAS Court denied with leave to replead, was timely under the foregoing analysis.
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Rosenberger, Ross, Asch and Kassal, JJ.