Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.
Suppression of physical evidence and the defendant's statements was properly denied. "In the circumstances presented, defendant's flight furnished reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was about to commit a crime such that pursuit by the officers was justified" (People v Matienzo, 81 N.Y.2d 778, 780; see also, People v Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444). The police rightfully pursued the defendant, and the contraband abandoned by the defendant during the course of that pursuit was properly admitted at trial.
However, the trial court improperly prevented defense counsel from questioning a police witness about various civil actions brought against him for alleged police brutality, false arrest, and his alleged use of excessive force. We therefore conclude that a new trial is warranted.
It is well settled that a witness may be interrogated upon cross-examination with respect to any immoral, vicious or criminal acts which may affect his character and show him to be unworthy of belief, provided the cross-examiner questions him in good faith and upon a reasonable basis in fact (People v Morales, 147 A.D.2d 381, 384; Richardson, Evidence § 498 [Prince 10th ed]). "When the witness is not the defendant, there is no danger that the jury will apply evidence of prior acts of misconduct to anything but the witness' credibility. Therefore, there is no proper basis to restrict cross-examination of a nondefendant witness as to such prior acts of misconduct" (People v Allen, 67 A.D.2d 558, 560, affd 50 N.Y.2d 898; see also, People v Williams, 142 A.D.2d 310, 316).
In the present case, the defendant established a good faith basis for the questions, and the information reflected upon the witness' trustworthiness. Although not every error which improperly curtails the right of the accused to cross-examine a prosecution witness is per se reversible error (People v Batista, 113 A.D.2d 890, 892), because Officer Snyder was the only witness who testified that the defendant disposed of the gun and the defense set forth was that the defendant had been framed, we cannot say that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Copertino and Santucci, JJ., concur.