Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and the facts, with costs, the objections to the orders dated September 12, 1990, and August 1, 1990, respectively, are sustained, those orders are vacated, and the petition for an upward modification of child support is dismissed.
We agree with the father that the mother failed to meet her burden of showing an unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances (see, Matter of Boden v Boden, 42 N.Y.2d 210), or that the needs of the parties' child could not adequately be met without an increase in child support (see, Matter of Brescia v Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132; Michaels v Michaels, 56 N.Y.2d 924; Matter of Krugman v St. Onge, 190 A.D.2d 734; Zucker v Zucker, 187 A.D.2d 507; cf., Matter of Berg v O'Leary, 193 A.D.2d 732). Nor did she establish a substantial change in circumstances occurring since the father's child support obligation was modified in 1981. Indeed, it appears from the record that the parties' relative financial circumstances with respect to each other have not substantially changed. Further, the father's child support obligation has increased periodically since 1981, pursuant to an escalation clause in the original separation agreement.
Considering the petition's lack of merit, the relative economic positions of the two parties, and the absence of proof of the mother's inability to pay, we also conclude that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees (see, e.g., Sementilli v Sementilli, 102 A.D.2d 78, 91; Wacholder v Wacholder, 188 A.D.2d 130). Bracken, J.P., O'Brien, Ritter and Copertino, JJ., concur.