By order entered October 25, 1989, the Court of Claims dismissed claimant's action for failure to serve a copy of the claim on the Attorney-General as required by Court of Claims Act § 11 (a). Claimant admits to this error in his brief on appeal. Claimant's February 5, 1991 motion for reconsideration was then denied by the court by order entered December 17, 1991. Claimant now appeals from both orders.
Claimant's appeal from the order entered October 25, 1989 must be dismissed as untimely (see, CPLR 5513 [a]; Stancage v Stancage, 173 A.D.2d 1081, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 1062). The statutory requirements regarding the time in which to bring an appeal are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly adhered to (see, Matter of Kolasz v Levitt, 63 A.D.2d 777, 779). Claimant's appeal from the order entered December 17, 1991 must also be dismissed. Because claimant's motion fails to allege any new or previously unknown facts, it must be considered a motion for reargument and not a motion for renewal (see, Levy v Blue Cross Blue Shield, 162 A.D.2d 931, 932). An order denying a motion to reargue is not appealable (see, Ambrosino v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 157 A.D.2d 993, lv dismissed 75 N.Y.2d 947). As a final matter, we note that claimant's failure to comply with the service requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (a) did not constitute a mere technical error, as claimant contends, but resulted in a failure of subject matter jurisdiction (see, Finnerty v New York State Thruway Auth., 75 N.Y.2d 721, 723); such failure is fatal (see, Matter of Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 177 A.D.2d 762, 763, affd 81 N.Y.2d 721).
Weiss, P.J., Yesawich Jr., Crew III, Mahoney and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeals are dismissed, without costs.