Judgment unanimously reversed as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and new trial granted. Memorandum: The trial court improperly instructed the jury that "[r]easonable doubt must * * * be based entirely and absolutely upon some good, sound, substantial reason" (see, People v Payne, 192 A.D.2d 1117; People v Frank, 186 A.D.2d 977; see also, People v Towndrow, 187 A.D.2d 194) and that the People bore the burden of establishing guilt "to a reasonable degree of certainty" (People v Payne, supra; People v Frank, supra). Because the court's charge effectively reduced the People's burden of proof and thereby deprived defendants of a fair trial we reverse defendants' convictions as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see, CPL 470.15) and grant a new trial.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), was sufficient to support defendant Theodore Freeman's convictions.
In view of our determinations, we do not reach defendants' remaining contentions.