Casey, J.
This Court has consistently followed the general rule that modifications of pendente lite awards should rarely be made by an appellate court and then only under exigent circumstances, such as a party's inability to meet his or her financial obligations or as otherwise required by justice (e.g., Suydam v. Suydam, 167 A.D.2d 752, 753). Plaintiff does not contend that he is unable to meet his financial obligations because of the pendente lite award. Although Supreme Court should have stated the reasoning for its choice under Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (3) for treatment of income in excess of $80,000 (see, Quilty v Quilty, 169 A.D.2d 979, 980), we see nothing in the record to establish that the temporary award is so excessive that justice requires our departure from the general rule. A prompt trial is the remedy for any claimed inequity (see, Marr v. Marr, 181 A.D.2d 974, 975; Wachob v. Wachob, 179 A.D.2d 912, 913).
Weiss, P.J., Mikoll, Yesawich Jr. and Crew III, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.