Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof relating to the imposition of the mandatory surcharge; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that the victim police officer's opportunity to observe the defendant in the well-lit street from approximately one foot away during a brutal attack and the officer's unequivocal in-court identification were legally sufficient to establish the defendant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v. Mouchette, 192 A.D.2d 561; People v. Caballero, 177 A.D.2d 496). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant also contends that he was deprived of his right to a public trial (see, People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, cert denied 444 U.S. 946) when the trial court sealed the courtroom during the testimony of certain undercover officers. We decline to reach the merits of this issue since it was not properly preserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v Pollock, 50 N.Y.2d 547, 550; People v. Brown, 188 A.D.2d 540; People v. Glaude, 176 A.D.2d 346; People v. Baez, 162 A.D.2d 602, 602-603).
The defendant contends that there was no probable cause to arrest him. It is well settled that information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a specific crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest (see, People v. Newton, 180 A.D.2d 764; People v Bingham, 176 A.D.2d 740). The record reveals that immediately after the attack, a detective spoke to two identified witnesses who placed the defendant at the scene as one of the attackers and provided the detective with the defendant's nickname and address. Subsequent investigation revealed the defendant's true full name and he was eventually arrested. Under these circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest the defendant.
The sentence imposed was neither unduly harsh nor excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). However, as conceded by the People, the imposition of the $150 mandatory surcharge in addition to the order of restitution was improper (see, People v. Turco, 130 A.D.2d 785, 788). Balletta, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Joy, JJ., concur.