Ordered that the judgment rendered under Indictment No. 2967/90 is modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction for robbery in the third degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment rendered under Indictment No. 12317/90 is affirmed.
As the People concede, and we agree, the defendant's conviction of robbery in the third degree must be dismissed as an inclusory concurrent count of robbery in the first degree (see, CPL 300.40 [b]; People v Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61, 64; People v Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427, 430). However, the defendant's contention that his conviction of robbery in the second degree should also be dismissed is without merit, since robbery in the second degree as defined in Penal Law § 160.10 (1) is not an inclusory concurrent count of robbery in the first degree as defined in Penal Law § 160.15 (3) (see, People v Mason, 128 A.D.2d 812, 813; People v Zada, 82 A.D.2d 926; see also, People v Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 701, 706).
The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Rosenblatt, J.P., Lawrence, O'Brien and Copertino, JJ., concur.