Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the People failed to introduce sufficient evidence pursuant to CPL 60.50 to corroborate his confession and sustain his conviction. We disagree. The corroboration requirement of CPL 60.50 is satisfied "by the production of some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone" (People v Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 629). The People met that requirement by introducing the testimony of the victim that his home had been broken into, that items were stolen therefrom, and that one of the stolen items was recovered from defendant (see, e.g., People v. Lacy, 127 A.D.2d 933, 934).
Defendant further contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Upon our review of the law and circumstances of this case, we conclude that the representation received by defendant was meaningful (see, People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 146-147; see generally, People v. Trait, 139 A.D.2d 937, 938, lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 867).
We also find meritless the contention that County Court erred in denying the motion to suppress defendant's statement to the police. He asserts that the court erred in crediting the testimony of the police officer rather than that of defendant. Great deference should be accorded the suppression court's determination (People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 761). Questions of credibility are primarily for the suppression court to determine and its findings will be upheld unless clearly erroneous (People v. Ackerman, 162 A.D.2d 793, 795). Here, the suppression court's determination to deny defendant's motion to suppress was supported by the record and, therefore, should not be disturbed (see, People v. Gee, 104 A.D.2d 561).
We also conclude that County Court properly tried defendant in absentia. Before a noon recess during defendant's trial, the court advised defendant that it was important for him to return after the recess and that, if he failed to do so, the trial would continue without him. Defendant, despite that warning, failed to return from the noon recess. The failure of defendant to return to court after the recess, despite being informed of the consequences of that act, constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to be present at trial (see, People v Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136, 141; People v. English, 186 A.D.2d 1022, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 788). Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the court exercised its sound discretion in determining to proceed in defendant's absence (see, People v. English, supra; People v. Smith, 148 A.D.2d 1007, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 747).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.